Timothy J. Sweeney
U.S. Department of Energy
Carlsbad Area Office
P.O. Box 3090
Carlsbad, NM 88221-3090

Jeffrey J. Winkel
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Waste Isolation Division
P.O. Box 2078
Carlsbad, NM 88221-2078

To support the mission of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) required a transportation system that would meet regulatory requirements and address the issues and concerns of the various stakeholders. The transport system is designed to transport 38,000 or more shipments of radioactive transuranic (TRU) waste over a 35-year period in a safe manner. The system must also meet or exceed all applicable regulatory transportation safety requirements.

The public perceives very high risk from the transportation of radioactive waste. With up to approximately 38,000 shipments scheduled, it is probabilistic that some of the shipments will be involved in accidents. The consequences associated with an incident depend on various factors, including: 1. Severity of accident forces; 2. Accident location and local demographics; 3. Quantity and type of material being transported; 4. Type of packaging used; 5. Fraction of material released; 6. Meteorological conditions; 7. Time of day; 8. Emergency response personnel response time; 9. Level of training and capability of response team; 10. Presence of dispersing mechanisms (wind, fire, water, explosion); and 11. Presence of other hazardous materials.

To achieve this objective, the DOE worked closely with the Western Governors' Association (WGA), the Southern States Energy Board (SSEB), the Indian tribal governments, and outside agencies to identify their concerns on the transport of radioactive material. Virtually all concerns of local, state, and tribal decision makers are met. Public perception of the transportation risk has begun to diminish through the DOE's efforts of public education, emergency response training, and demonstrated proficiency in transportation exercises. Public perception of risk will continue to dissipate as the shipping campaign demonstrates its safety through uneventful operations.

To support the WIPP mission, the DOE required a transportation system that would meet regulatory requirements and address the issues and concerns of the various stakeholders. The transport system is designed to transport approximately 38,000 shipments of contact-handled (CH) and remote-handled (RH) TRU waste over a 35-year period in a safe manner. The system must also meet or exceed all applicable regulatory transportation safety requirements. To achieve this objective, the DOE worked closely with the WGA and the SSEB, the Indian tribal governments, and outside agencies to identify their concerns on the transport of radioactive material. Using the various inputs, the DOE built a transportation system that has set standards for the transportation industry. The system incorporates an integrated equipment design,^1,2,3 highly qualified drivers,^1,2,3 training for emergency response personnel, and testing and evaluation of both equipment and personnel.

With up to 38,000 shipments scheduled, it is probabilistic that some of the shipments will be involved in accidents. The consequences associated with an incident depend on various factors, including: 1. Severity of accident forces; 2. Accident location and local demographics; 3. Quantity and type of material being transported; 4. Type of packaging used; 5. Fraction of material released; 6. Meteorological conditions; 7. Time of day; 8. Emergency response personnel response time; 9. Level of training and capability of response team; 10. Presence of dispersing mechanisms (wind, fire, water, explosion); and 11. Presence of other hazardous materials.

This paper describes how the DOE Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) National Transuranic Waste Program (NTP) transportation system addresses each of these items and how these results respond to public concerns and perceptions. The paper will show how the system incorporates an integrated equipment design, training for emergency response personnel, and testing and evaluation of both equipment and personnel.

Over 90% of the routes used for WIPP shipments will be on the safest roads in the country, the U.S. Interstates. By avoiding locations that could result in head-on collisions, the system significantly reduces the physical impact forces possible in the case of an accident.

By requiring each tractor to have two fully-qualified drivers, the WIPP system also reduces the potential for driver fatigue, which reduces the probability of an accident occurring at all.

For the NRC to certify a packaging as Type B, the packaging must successfully assure, by physical test and/or analyses, that the packaging will contain its contents, even in an accident situation. The tests are described in Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 Part 71.73 (10CFR' 71.73), "Hypothetical Accident Conditions." Briefly, the package is constructed and loaded with a payload to simulate the actual materials to be transported. The package is then dropped from 9 meters (30 feet) onto an unyielding surface to inflict the most severe damage. Secondly, the package is dropped from 1 meter (40 inches) onto a bar 15 centimeters (6 inches) in diameter and at least 20 centimeters (8 inches) in length. Following the drop tests, the package is subjected to a hydrocarbon fire. The fire must fully involve and expose the package to at least 800^o C (1,475^o F) with an emissivity coefficient of at least 0.9 for at least 30 minutes. The final test is immersion in at least 15 meters (50 feet) of water.

In several instances critics have stated that the tests should include "real-life" crashes, such as falling off a truck down a mountainside or slamming into a rail abutment. To answer these questions, a comparison of several crash tests to the TRUPACT-II testing is in order.

During the 30-meter drop testing, the three TRUPACT-II certification test units were dropped approximately three times each. The speed attained in a drop test is approximately 35 miles per hour. The gravitational forces (g's) experienced in the drop test were up to 386 g's⁴. The g's experienced during the test were from the very sudden stop on the "unyielding surface," not the speed attained.

In tests⁵ conducted by the DOE and Sandia National Laboratories, a spent nuclear fuel cask was subjected to real-life crashes. The cask was mounted on a tractor-trailer and slammed into a timber, soil, and concrete block abutment at 96.6 kilometers per hour (60 miles per hour). The forces experienced during this test reached 200 g's.

In a second test⁶, a diesel locomotive crashed into a spent nuclear fuel cask. The cask was staged on a trailer perpendicular to the rails to simulate a high-velocity grade crossing incident. The locomotive impacted the cask at 130 kilometers per hour (81 miles per hour). The cask experienced 200 g's during the impact. The collision caused some damage to the exterior of the cask. The fuel rods inside the cask appeared undamaged to a visual examination. Physical measurements of the fuel assembly revealed a slight distortion of 0.2 inches. The cask maintained its containment capability throughout the incident.

In July 1984 the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) conducted a similar test⁷ with a spent nuclear fuel cask. The cask was placed directly on train rails and a diesel engine train and three cars traveling at 160.9 kilometers per hour (100 miles per hour) rammed the cask. Again, the cask sustained only superficial damage, while the train was severely damaged. Instrumentation on the train and the cask indicated that the cask sustained approximately 60 g's during the test and still maintained its leak-tight integrity.

From the above examples, one can see that the NRC hypothetical accident testing inflicts forces on the packaging that exceed the forces of real-life crash tests. Therefore, if a package can achieve NRC certification, it will certainly provide the containment needed for day-to-day transport, including incident conditions.

As previously mentioned, over 90% of the transportation routes are on Interstate Highways. In cases where the route must pass through a difficult demographic area, specific measures have been taken to reduce the potential risk to the public.

Public Law 102-579 of the 102^nd Congress, dated October 30, 1992, commonly referred to as the Land Withdrawal Act, mandated a highway bypass around the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico. The primary purpose of the bypass is to circumvent Santa Fe for the transport of TRU wastes from the Los Alamos National Laboratory to WIPP. In accordance with the law, the bypass must be in place or sufficient funds must be allotted to the state of New Mexico for the construction of the bypass for shipments to commence.

The CAO has directed sufficient funds to the state for construction of the bypass. This direction of funds meets the criteria of the Land Withdrawal Act to commence shipping from Los Alamos. A temporary two-lane Santa Fe bypass should open by November 1998.

The city of Roswell petitioned the state and received sufficient funding from the DOE New Mexico highway improvement allotment fund. The Roswell bypass opened in November 1997.

The purpose of these bypasses is to direct the perceived threat of a radioactive material incident away from the mainstream traffic and population.

The materials to be transported by the WIPP transportation system are defense program TRU wastes. The waste consists of lab-ware, anti-contamination clothing, valves, piping, residues, and solidified sludges contaminated with plutonium and hazardous materials.. The TRU waste is volumetric, giving rise to a low concentration of plutonium in each waste container. The certificate of compliance for the WIPP packagings prohibits free liquids, but does permit residual liquids up to less than 1 percent by volume.

Preliminary shipment calculations indicate that shipments of CH waste will not involve highway route controlled quantities of radioactive material. The external dose rates of the shipping packages will meet the Department of Transportation requirements - less than 2 millisieverts per hour (200 millirem per hour) on contact and less than 0.1 millsieverts per hour (10 millirem/hour) at 2 meters from the packaging. From our shipping experience at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), the contact dose rate is at, or near, background levels.

Just as plutonium is a contaminate to the waste material, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act constituents are minimal. The WIPP shipping package provides more than adequate protection from these hazards.

The transport of the hazardous materials in the United States is governed by CFR Title 49. These regulations specify Type B packaging for the type of materials to be transported to WIPP. The DOE has further committed to the state of New Mexico that only NRC certified Type B packaging will be used.

Because the plutonium is a contaminant and the waste is volumetric, a transportation system had to be designed to create the largest payload per shipment. Existing lead-shielded containers were too restrictive in their payload. The need for a greater payload led to a new generation of Type B packaging design - a "soft package." The use of this soft package reduced the packaging weight, increased the payload, and minimized the number of shipments.

At present, WIPP has one NRC-certified packaging. The TRUPACT-II is designed to transport the CH TRU waste from the generator sites to the WIPP Site. The TRUPACT-II (Fig. 1) is a double- containment, non-vented packaging. The double containment allows the transport of greater than 0.54 Giga-Becquerels (GBq) (20 curies) of plutonium. The packaging is designed for TRU waste in 14, 208 liter (55-gallon) drums, or two standard waste boxes, or one 10-drum overpack. The TRUPACT-II is a right circular cylinder with a domed lid. The TRUPACT-II is transported in the upright position. Up to three TRUPACT-IIs may be transported on a single-purpose trailer, provided the gross vehicle weight does not exceed 36,320 kilograms (80,000 pounds).

Use of the TRUPACT-II began in 1992, when TRU waste was transported between the Radioactive Waste Management Complex and the Argonne National Laboratory-West at the INEEL. In June of 1997 the TRUPACT-II made its first interstate transport of TRU waste from Westwood, New Jersey, to the Rocky Flats Environmental Technologies Site outside Denver, Colorado. The WIPP Project will open in May 1998 with 15 TRUPACT-IIs.

WIPP has one Safety Analysis Report for Packaging in the NRC review process. This packaging is designed for the transport of RH TRU waste. The RH-TRU 72-B design (72-B) (Fig. 2) is based on the design of the 125B spent nuclear fuel cask used to ship the Three Mile Island material to the INEEL. The 72-B is a double-containment, non-vented, shielded packaging. The overall appearance of the 72-B is the traditional right circular cylinder with end-fitting impact limiters.

The waste canister for the 72-B packaging is approximately 3.05 meters (10 feet) by 66 centimeters (26 inches) with a volume of 0.9 cubic meters (31.7 cubic feet). The canister may be direct-loaded or loaded with drummed TRU waste with a maximum of three 208-liter drums. Per the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), the canister may have a contact dose of 1 Sievert per hour (100 Rem per hour). The WAC permits by written exception a canister dose rate of 10 Sieverts per hour (1,000 Rem per hour).

The 72-B cask is to be transported by truck on a drop-bed, specially designed trailer. The unique design will incorporate a cradle for transportation and cask uprighting for loading and unloading operations. The gross vehicle weight of the 72-B will be less than the 36,320-kilogram highway permit limitations.

WIPP is in the process of developing a second generation TRUPACT-II: The HALFPACK (Fig 3). The HALFPACK is approximately 76 centimeters (30 inches) shorter and 1,135 kilograms (2,500 pounds) lighter than the TRUPACT-II packaging. The purpose of the HALFPACK is to increase the shipment payload for heavy drums. Using a TRUPACT-II, only 14 heavy drums may be transported per trailer (to stay below the 36,320-kilogram limit). By using the HALFPACK, the shipment load can be increased by 50 percent, to 21 drums. This increase in payload will save approximately 2,000 TRU waste shipments. NRC Type B certification testing of the HALFPACK packaging is scheduled for March 1998.

Inclement weather conditions can create hazardous travel conditions. The WIPP will optimize shipping schedules to reduce the number of shipments during seasons when adverse weather is likely. The weather is also monitored 24 hours a day, and reports are available to the drivers at any time or location. The states can provide information on unexpected weather changes directly to the WIPP Central Monitoring Room for immediate communications with the drivers. Safe parking protocols and locations have been identified by each state for the WIPP shipments. Current weather conditions, the weather forecast, and road conditions must be acceptable prior to the dispatching of a WIPP shipment. As an additional safety precaution, the WIPP drivers are authorized to pull over and seek shelter if road conditions deteriorate from a safe condition salaried employees, and pay is not tied to the promptness of a delivery.

The current weather conditions can be an aid or a hindrance in the mitigation of a hazardous material incident. Winds can disperse material before containment can be achieved. This creates a much larger control and mitigation problem. On the other hand, that same wind can provide respiratory protection to personnel upwind of the hazardous materials. In the same manner, rain can be an asset or a liability. Too much rain and the material is washed into the environment, again causing a containment problem. For materials that have a tendency to become airborne, a little rain will hold them in place.

Weather can have an adverse effect on personnel as well. Lower temperatures may cause hypothermia in accident victims. Higher temperatures can bring on an increased rate of fatigue in emergency response personnel. This fatigue is caused by the wearing of bunker gear and respirators.

The time of day that an incident occurs can be a major player in the response to an incident. Should an incident occur during the rush hour, emergency response personnel are hampered in their efforts to arrive at the scene. An additional burden is placed on the Incident Commander in the simple logistics of traffic control.

To minimize undue risk, the WIPP shipments will attempt to avoid travel during peak traffic hours in the larger communities. The CAO has agreed to the above stakeholder concerns when necessary to reduce the risk of the citizens within a community.

Response time to any emergency is crucial to mitigation of the incident. The shorter the response time, the sooner the Incident Commander can evaluate the situation, attend to the injured, if applicable, establish scene control, and address any ongoing hazards.

Several factors affect response time. Obviously, if the incident occurs miles from the response agency, response time is lengthy. Traffic conditions can lengthen response time if there is congestion or blockage. Weather also plays a factor, as inclement weather can reduce travel speeds to below normal transit time or cause routing problems. The physical location of the incident relative to the responding agencies can be a hindrance. If the incident is in the southbound lane and the responding agency is northbound, a suitable crossover must be found.

WIPP shipments are monitored by the Transportation Tracking and Communications System (TRANSCOM). TRANSCOM is a satellite communications system designed to provide tracking and communications for DOE shipments of radioactive materials. Each state and tribal nation impacted on WIPP route by the WIPP shipments are provided funding and training for monitoring shipments within their jurisdiction. The system enhances safety during transportation and assists in emergency preparedness and response. Users monitor the transport and can pin-point truck locations within 305 meters (1,000 feet). The Central Monitoring Room also maintains verbal communication with the drivers and can/will make emergency notifications for the drivers.

Additionally, jurisdictions along the route are provided an eight week schedule, updated monthly, of all shipments. This allows responders to be aware of the time windows that shipments will pass through their area. Additionally, each tractor is equipped with a Citizens Band (CB) radio, a cellular phone, and a satellite phone that will allow the drivers to promptly notify response agencies in case of an incident.

The above section on the testing of the TRUPACT-II demonstrates the safety of the packaging. The NRC testing demonstrated the TRUPACT's ability to withstand fire and water. Additionally, without a release of radionuclides, wind is no longer a factor. The probability of an explosion is minimal. The only scenarios that include an explosion require an outside source.

Although most shipments will contain mixed TRU waste, that is, waste that contains both radioactive and hazardous constituents, the inability of these to escape from the TRUPACT-II package renders them insignificant in the risk analyses. In case of a severe accident, the only projected hazardous materials would be those in the transportation vehicle, e.g., diesel fuel, oil, antifreeze solution.

In a pure transportation system, there are no releases of hazardous materials from their respective containers. With the testing required for a packaging system to be certified by the NRC as Type B, near purity is achieved.

The NRC certification of the WIPP packaging system takes credit for two independent levels of containment - the inner- and outer-containment vessels of the packaging. In reality the CH TRU- waste may have up to seven layers of containment. The waste is packaged in one to three separate plastic bags. These bags of waste are further confined by a 90-mil plastic inner drum liner. The 90-mil plastic liner is placed inside the 208-liter carbon-steel drum. The drum is then placed in the double- containment vessels of the shipping package.

Using the NRC testing criteria and the further confinement of the waste, one can determine that a release of contents in whole or in part due to an incident has a very low probability. This is further supported by the history of transportation in the U.S. A review of the Department of Transportation's Hazardous Materials Incident Reports for February 2, 1981, through September 6, 1991, produces 32 incidents identified involving radioactive materials in Type A and Type B packaging. Of these 32 incidents, zero involved the release of radioactive material from the packaging.

The amount and types of radiological response training varies tremendously from state to state. Most states do not have the resources to conduct training for a specific hazard such as transuranic waste. To supplement a state's training, the DOE developed the State and Tribal Education Program (STEP) emergency responder training courses for WIPP shipments. These courses were developed in consultation with the western states. To determine a state need for these courses, each state evaluated the capabilities of its emergency response personnel. The evaluation determines the current radiological response capabilities and training necessary to maintain and improve capabilities, enhancing responders' abilities to safely respond to a WIPP shipment incident. The WIPP emergency responder training course is the only one in the nation that has been certified by the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

To address the knowledge and experience level of the emergency response teams along the routes to the WIPP site, the DOE agreed to provide training to the state and tribal first responders. The STEP provides training in emergency response actions, hazardous constituents, the incident command system, incident mitigation, and medical management. This program has given the first responders a greater appreciation not only of TRU waste, but of all hazards involved in transportation incidents.

The STEP has enjoyed success in parallel with the transport system. The STEP has grown from emergency response training for local responders to include training for county and state health agencies. A further outgrowth of the STEP program is a greater involvement in increased levels of training at the state and tribal levels, especially at state-sponsored hazardous materials conferences. Many of the students extend invitations to WIPP to make awareness presentations to their respective private and public groups.

An exercise program has been developed as an integral part of the WIPP training program. The exercise program provides an opportunity to evaluate local and state capabilities. Although the WIPP program was designed to determine the local and state response capabilities to a WIPP incident, the methods taught in the training and exercise programs are identical to methods used in response to other hazardous or radiological materials.

In the past seven years the TRU transportation system has conducted 19 integrated exercises with the states and tribal nations. The first exercise, Transportation Accident Exercise (TRANSAX-90), involved participants from the local area (Colorado Springs), the host state (Colorado), DOE and contractor personnel from the WIPP site, DOE Albuquerque, DOE Headquarters, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. One of the lessons learned from this exercise was that more emphasis was needed on the response at the state and local level. This has given birth to the WIPP Transportation Exercises (WIPPTREX) and New Mexico specific NM WIPPTRAXs (Transportation Accident Exercises). Both exercise programs use scenarios based on real transportation incidents. The demand for these exercises is growing due to the value received by the state and local emergency response agencies. To accommodate states needs and requests, WIPPTREXs are currently conducted at the rate of two per year per route. The primary goal of the exercises is communication between all levels of responders. The secondary goal is the establishment of interagency interactions. The last objective is the strengthening of the performance of each agency. Each exercise is fully critiqued and a written report is available for reference. One of the strong common threads of the exercises is the strengthening of communications at the local, state, and federal levels.

The CAO transportation system conducts the WIPPTREX and NMWIPPTRAX exercises throughout the year. The exercises incorporate the traffic problems, interference by passersby, and additional hazards that may be involved. The assessment of an incident situation by the emergency response personnel is needed to identify all of the hazards involved. During the classroom training and the hands-on exercises conducted with the states, an emphasis is placed on the total scene evaluation. The STEP training builds the response teams' capability to go beyond the old perceived threat of radioactivity and to treat the patient immediately even before measuring for contamination. The responsible authority, usually the local law enforcement agency, is evaluated on how well the incident is managed.

Scene control is one of the topics addressed by the classroom instruction provided by the STEP. Scene control addresses the issues of protecting the injured and the emergency responder from oncoming traffic, as well as keeping passersby from interfering or taking souvenirs.

Eight years ago, if one were to ask what the dangers associated with the WIPP transportation system were, the unanimous answer would have been radiation and contamination. Today, after the STEP training program has opened a route, the answer is very different. Today, the first responder is not likely to focus only on the fact that a radioactive shipment is involved and to the disregard other hazards. The education of the first responder through the STEP program has brought them to be aware of the many hazards on the road.

In today's transportation world, at any given time, one can be in close proximity to flammable liquids, corrosives, compressed gases, and poisons. Many of these products we use every day and disregard their potential hazards. The other hazardous materials in transportation can provide a serious challenge and/or a very real danger to the first responder. It is only through total incident evaluation that the first response team can make an entry, extract any injured, or mitigate the consequences without becoming the injured or the statistic.

The integration of many elements and stakeholders concerns into one system for the transport of TRU waste has produced the WIPP transportation system: The safest transportation system in the world. The WIPP transportation system is truly a circle of safety. No one element of the system stands alone. Each is dependent upon the other. Each provides backup, or a substitute, should an element falter. It is this integration of all facets that led the National Academy of Sciences to proclaim, "The system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels."⁸

1. T. Ward, V. Daub, M. McFadden, The WIPP Transportation System: Dedicated to Safety, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Carlsbad Area Office, 1990
2. T. Ward, R. Spooner, The WIPP Transportation System: The First Four Years, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, Carlsbad Area Office, 1994
3. J. Winkel, R. Spooner, WIPP TRU Waste Transportation: A Circle of Safety, DOE/WIPP 95-2145, January 1996
4. Safety Analysis Report for the TRUPACT-II Shipping Package, Document Number 71-9218, prepared by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P.O. Box 2078, Carlsbad, New Mexico, 1989
5. H. Richard Yoshimura, "Engineered for Safety"; "Five Full Scale Tests," videotape, Sandia National Laboratories Video Services
6. Michael Huerta, and H. Richard Yoshimura, A Study and Full-Scale Test of a High-Velocity Grade-Crossing Simulated Accident of a Locomotive and a Nuclear-Spent-Fuel Shipping Cask, SAND79-2291, Sandia National Laboratories (printed February 1983)
7. Central Electricity Generating Board, Smash Hit, includes British Broadcasting Company news clips, Film video Branch 1984,
8. National Academy of Sciences, Review Comments on DOE Document DOE/WIPP 89-011: Draft Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Test Phase: Performance Assessment and Operations Demonstration, June 19, 1989