

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NRC NEAR TERM TASK FORCE

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NRC RESPONSE

- **Monitoring Mode**
- **Japan site team**
- **Information gathering**
- **Near Term Task Force**



NRC INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

- **Temporary Instruction 2515/183, “Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event” uses a combination of assessment of licensee actions and independent inspections**
- **Temporary Instruction 2515/184, “Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)” To determine that the SAMGs are available and assess how they are being implemented**
 - To determine the nature and extent of licensee implementation of SAMG training and exercises

INSPECTION RESULTS FOR TI 2515/183

- **Inspections completed in April 2011**
- **The inspection reports and a summary of the findings are available on NRC's web site**
- **Observations “indicate a potential industry trend of failure to maintain equipment and strategies required to mitigate some design and beyond design basis events”**
- **However, “no functions were compromised that would have resulted in damage to the fuel elements or containment”**

Near Term Task Force - Conclusions

- **Similar sequence of events in the U.S. is unlikely**
- **Mitigation measures could reduce the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases**
- **No imminent risk from continued operation and continued licensing activities**

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Two recommendations for action to enhance NRC programs**
- **Six recommendations for industry action to enhance safety**
- **Four recommendations for NRC longer-term study**



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **The six industry actions address**
 - Seismic and Flooding protection
 - Prolonged Loss of AC Power
 - Containment Venting
 - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
 - Severe Accident Procedures
 - Emergency Preparedness

TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Require licensees to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of systems, structures, and components.**



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- Strengthen station blackout mitigation capability for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events




TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Require reliable hardened vent designs in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments**



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- Enhance spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Strengthen and integrate onsite emergency response capabilities**
 - Emergency operating procedures
 - Severe accident management guidelines
 - Extensive damage mitigation guidelines



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Require that facility emergency plans address prolonged SBO and multi-unit events**



TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Longer Term Review Topics**
 - Evaluate potential enhancements to prevent or mitigate fires/floods
 - Hydrogen control/mitigation inside containment and other buildings
 - Pursue EP topics related to multi-unit events and prolonged SBO
 - Pursue EP topics related to decision-making, radiation monitoring, education

NTTF - Recommendations

- **Twelve over-arching recommendations**
- **Detailed recommendations support implementation**
 - Near-term and interim actions
 - Rulemaking
 - Longer-term evaluations topics

SUMMARY

- **No imminent risk from continued operation and continued licensing activities**
- **NRC's regulatory framework could be enhanced**
- **Additional requirements and nuclear power plant improvements for low probability, high consequence events, would reduce risk even further**

INSIGHTS

- **Importance of competent, independent regulatory body**
- **Importance of site selection and characterization**
- **Importance of design features to cope with site hazards**
- **Modern reactor designs with enhanced safety features**
- **Accident management and emergency response**