

Maintaining World-Class Safety During Times of Change



David Brockman

Manager, Richland Operations Office

U.S. Department of Energy

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Set Clear Expectations

- Include provisions for safe transition in requests for proposals
 - Focus more on nuclear safety than industrial hazards (e.g., slips, trips and falls)
- Write expectations into contracts
 - Require safety and health transition plans
 - Require readiness reviews during transition
- Train your federal staff

Work Together

- Work with contractors to define readiness assessments with a graded approach
 - Collaborative attitude essential...involve program “owners” on daily basis
 - Federal Project Directors
 - Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
 - Allow outgoing and incoming contractors to work together if possible

Consider Past Experiences

- Hanford: River Corridor Contract transition in 2005
- Sent personnel to Savannah River Site to learn from the M&O contract transition



EM Environmental Management

safety ❖ performance ❖ cleanup ❖ closure

Readiness Isn't the Final Chapter

- When readiness is demonstrated and contractor transition is complete, transition continues
 - Integrated Safety Management System, Environmental Management System verification
 - Evaluation of transition and post-transition performance

Review of Our Transition

- EM Office of Oversight (EM-62) assessed Hanford Plateau Remediation Contract in January 2009 (~3 months after transition)
- No significant issues (findings) related to lines of inquiry
- Positive feedback and seven specific observations for improvement

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Most significant: 60 days for transition
 - Long enough to determine material difference between “as found” conditions and request for proposal
 - Not sufficient time to review individual programs and procedures in detail, or to align procedures with the new contract organization

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Oversight
 - DOE implemented a successful transition oversight program
 - Not all potential issues validated during contract transition were tracked to closure
 - DOE transition process did not include a review of existing Exemptions and Equivalencies that would be necessary for the incoming contractor to operate within requirements of the new contract

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Corrective Action Management
 - DOE program meets expectations. Federal staff actively involved in assuring open corrective actions were addressed.
 - Out of hundreds of open corrective actions, the incoming contractor closed several without adequate documentation of corrective action completion and closed one issue that should have remained open

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Contractor Assurance System
 - Incoming contractor successfully adopted the prior contractor's assurance system
- Conduct of Operations
 - Incoming contractor successfully transitioned the previously approved program
 - New programs by incoming contractor (Safety Analysis Center, Executive Safety Review Board) enhanced the effectiveness of the overall program

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Worker Safety and Health
 - Incoming contractor successfully transitioned the previously established worker safety and health programs
 - Personnel and safety responsibilities were transferred appropriately
 - Hoisting and rigging workers demonstrated less than adequate concern with safety precautions while handling suspended loads

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Worker Safety, cont'd
 - Practice of approving Hot Work permits 30 days in advance is a non-conservative interpretation of federal regulations and Hanford requirements
- Work Planning and Control
 - Incoming contractor performed adequate transition for the work planning and control process

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Work Planning and Control, cont'd
 - Current process is adequate and incoming contractor added new processes (e.g., Hazard Review Board, Technical Response Team)
 - DOE transition review of the Occupational Safety Industrial Health Program was improperly used as acceptance criteria for several specific work planning and control transition checklist items
 - During one observation, a work control planner was inadequately prepared for a job-planning meeting

Assessment Feedback and Observations

- Team Composition and Responsibilities
 - Review team included a cross-section of safety management system and technical specialists who have extensive experience and background in contractor oversight, operations, work planning and control, and the development of DOE safety directives and standards

Craig Scott, Team Leader; Terrance Tracy, Oversight and Corrective Action Mgmt.; Ed Westbrook, Contractor Assurance System, Conduct of Operations; Hernan Castellanos, Worker Safety; Dennis Oba, Work Planning & Control