PEOPLE ISSUES ON A MAJOR
NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
Grahame Codd and David Clements
BNFL Inc.
ABSTRACT
Behind large decommissioning and decontamination (D&D) projects are the people performing the work. While their behavior and feelings are often taken for granted, they can dramatically affect work performance. A personal involvement with a project can be difficult in large, bureaucratic institutions. Safety and work effectiveness can be jeopardized if procedures and work patterns do not address requirements at the operator level. BNFL proposes introducing cultural changes into the workplace to address these issues at a large D&D project at a DOE-sponsored site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. BNFL and its partners will remove approximately 114,000 tonnes of plant and equipment currently present in gaseous diffusion plants. Drawing upon 14 years of experience in the United Kingdom at a similar site, BNFL will introduce a comprehensive program to address safety issues. Cornerstones of this program are culture change workshops and ongoing auditing activities that involve the workers and managers themselves. Work planning will result in effective instruction. Quality assurance and productivity are also being addressed. A strong teamwork is stressed throughout. Flexible staffing and the active participation of workers in safety programs and productivity complete the program. It is intended that this project demonstrate a way forward into the 21st Century as an agent of change to promote and develop a D&D workforce that works safer and is more productive.
INTRODUCTION
The DOE-sponsored Three-Building D&D and Recycle Project in Oak Ridge at the East Tennessee Technology Park (formerly the K-25 Site, see Fig. 1) is scheduled to remove all 114,000 tonnes of plant and equipment from inside the buildings, the buildings cleaned for unrestricted re-use, and the contents of the buildings size-reduced, decontaminated, and recycled for unrestricted industrial re-use, either within the cleaned buildings or elsewhere. A detailed description of the project's scope, schedule, key technologies employed, and anticipated safety hazards is outlined in the Appendix.
Figure 1. Site of the ETTP Three-Building D&D and Recycle Project.
People are educated and trained to create, not to destroy or pull down. The decommissioning world generally requires dismantling and size reduction, however, and the process is usually seen as demotivating. Historically, government-sponsored projects in both the USA and U. K. have people believing they work for an impersonal "system" for which they have little ownership. The "system" appears to lack feelings, identity, accountability, and a real commitment to engender personal responsibility for safety and quality. To counteract these perceptions and motivate people to work safer and more effectively, a cultural change must be introduced.
This paper addresses the problems associated with managing these "people" aspects of the major D&D Project at Oak Ridge, and describes the cultural changes being introduced. It focuses on the real work experience not only of the Oak Ridge Project but also quotes experience gained in the UK in managing a similar nuclear decommissioning project.
The key aspects of work likely to be affected by introducing cultural changes will be:
Safety
In any world-class organization safety comes first, but what practical things can and must be done by BNFL Inc. and its team to enhance safety via the involvement of people in the work process?
BNFL Inc. will introduce the concept of 24 hour-a-day Behavioral Safety. Behavioral safety improves safety by changing peoples'behavior before an accident occurs. This concept will eliminate the time spent on an investigation to determine what could or could not have been done. Instead, behavioral safety will challenge people to be safety conscious throughout the day, both at home and at work.
The foundation of the system is based upon two key programs- a culture change workshop and a Safe and Unsafe Acts Auditing (SUSA) activity. The culture change workshop is usually given in the first week of employment, during an induction course. The culture change workshop presupposes that, all too frequently, organizational culture accepts all accidents, injuries, and unsafe acts as part of the job; this culture is seen not only in the workforce, but in managers as well. The culture change workshop challenges this attitude and starts to establish a "buy-in" from the workforce and managers that injuries and unsafe practices in the workplace are unacceptable and will not be tolerated. The workshop establishes the fact the 96% of accidents are caused by the unsafe behaviors of the individuals involved and that accidents are not uncontrollable "acts of God". All accidents are preventable.
The workshop program begins with a Culture Change Workshop 1 (CCW1) for managers; all managers must attend. It is vital that the senior manager attends the workshop and contributes fully. At the end of the workshop, a safety "vision" will have been established and each manager will have begun to make a change in his or her personal behavior that will improve safety in the project. CCW1 for managers is followed by a series of CCW1's for the workforce in each individual line manager's area; these are led by the manager himself, with assistance from the project safety advisor. The senior manager must introduce and "wrap up" each session to demonstrate the importance of the initiative. At the end of the process, each individual will be aware of the 96% statistic and of the safety excellence culture that is being established. Furthermore, each will begin to improve his or her own safety behaviors. A list of of safety issues affecting the area in which they work results from this session; individuals will be empowered to address many the actions themselves.
Safe and Unsafe Acts Auditing (SUSA) is the cornerstone of the behavioral safety process. The technique is a non-threatening method of auditing behavior in the work place to encourage safe behaviors (and conditions) and to discourage unsafe behavior.
The SUSA procedure requires auditors to discuss safety with individuals in the workplace and provides a powerful tool for encouraging individuals to consider the possible consequences of their unsafe actions and to modify their behaviour accordingly. After completing the CCW's, individuals from each area are selected for SUSA training. As a minimum, all line managers, supervisors, and interested hourly paid employees should be trained in the SUSA procedure. Once trained, the auditors are required to carry out at least a specified minimum number of audits per month. After each audit, a feedback form is completed and posted in a safety records systems for reference by all. This form does not include the names of the individuals who were audited but does include:
The more managers and hourly paid people carry out this activity, the more personnel truly believe that safety does come first. The documentation is simple and non-bureaucratic, and findings can be shared easily with other potentially affected personnel.
BNFL Inc.'s Enhanced Work Planning (EWP) builds on the safety foundation formed by the culture change workshops and SUSA audits. Once a specific work task is identified, a team is set-up with subject matter experts whose role is to identify the hazards, mitigate the hazards, and produce an instruction for the hourly paid person to carry out the task is a safe manner. While this sounds no different from many processes conducted in most organizations, EWP has one major improvement-one of the most important subject matter experts is included at this early stage-the hourly paid worker himself. How can we expect "buy-in" to the instruction if workers are not part of the process for generating the documents? Without their practical knowledge, the instructions produced can be wrong or difficult to follow.
Once the instructions have been produced, the team tests them in the field to ensure that nothing has been missed that could effect safety, quality, or productivity on the job. Only when management and worker are satisfied should the remainder of the work crews be trained. If the training is carried out too early, crews go through a needlessly difficult and time-consuming process "unlearning" a flawed instruction set and learning a new method. It is clearly better to do something right the first time rather than try to correct errors.
Another key area of the strategy is the use of one minute assessments, in which people are asked to simply "step back" from the task before they start or resume an activity, then ask themselves, "Has anything changed that may create a new hazard in the area? Should I take additional precautions?" It may be as simple as a patch of water or oil on the floor or some poor housekeeping in the area that could lead to one of the most common forms of accident, the "slip, trip, and fall" scenario.
Case studies of accidents and incidents on the ETTP site and other plants in the UK and USA will also be used. In these sessions, managers and hourly paid personnel will act as the investigating committee into a real accident or incident; they will be tasked with reaching conclusions and giving recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the incident. A senior manager will conduct the sessions and will initially define the basic facts about the accident. It is then up to the committee to interview the manager, who is fully familiar with all aspects of the accident, to determine what the causes were. Because employees on the committee are involved in the process and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence, this method gets better buy-in than simply telling people the answers.
Quality Management System
Many modern quality management systems are large, unwieldy, often out-of-date, cost a significant amount of money and effort, and lead to noncompliances. In addition, separate systems are usually established for quality assurance, safety, and environmental management. These systems frequently do not reflect the real work at the operator level.
In defining its Quality Management System for ETTP, BNFL Inc. has defined only those standards that apply to the project; other standards are not used. Instructions are written using subject matter experts- including experts from the hourly paid workforce-and are kept as short and concise as possible, containing only relevant information to ensure safety, environmental, and quality aspects of the task. The system assumes that people will be properly trained and qualified and allows them some discretion in the way certain activities are carried out, providing they do not effect safety, environment, or quality. This system is aimed at moving the emphasis from a paperwork-based system to a people-based system in which people have better control of how they perform their tasks (see Fig. 2).
Figure 2. Change of Emphasis of QA System
In a traditional system a person needs equipment to do the work and some work to do- i.e., "cut up the pipe with a saw." A significant amount of paperwork and instructional material often accompanies this work, sometimes more than is warranted or appropriate. In BNFL Inc.'s Work Smart Q. A. System, the work to be done and the equipment supplied is the same, but a significantly increased emphasis is placed upon the person to use his "brain" rather than just his body in carrying out the task. While instructions are still required, they are smaller, more understandable, and contain only the necessary and sufficient safety, environmental, and quality information in them.
Productivity
With teamwork being paramount to the success of the project, BNFL Inc. recognized well before the contract was signed with DOE Oak Ridge that union/management relationships were key to the ETTP project. It was therefore decided that as early as February, 1997, discussions should be held with the appropriate unions to inform them that BNFL Plc. had always worked cooperatively with the unions and that BNFL Inc. felt that they had a key part to play in ensuring the project's success by early involvement in safety, environmental, and quality issues. To this end, many sessions were held to discuss how BNFL Inc. would go about engendering an excellent safety culture. Discussions were also held about the flexibility that would be required by craft employees on the job and how they would be working in multi-disciplined crews. Early discussions were extremely encouraging and led to the signing of a project labor agreement on August 7, 1997, with the Knoxville Building Trades and its International Officers. Both the unions and BNFL Inc. saw the agreement as an extremely good win/win situation. The Union International President has since stated that "they are pleased and proud to enter into this project labor agreement with BNFL Inc.," and "they have negotiated safeguards into this agreement to protect the workers and to assure the work is accomplished under the strictest safety guideline".
The agreement has a no-strike clause. The productivity clause will generate bonuses for hourly paid if the project is completed safely and in advance of the prescribed dates.
BNFL Inc. can direct their working forces at their prerogative, including but not limited to hiring, promotion, transfer, lay-off, or discharge for just cause. No rules, customs, or practices shall be permitted or observed that limit or restrict production or limit or restrict the working efforts of employees. BNFL Inc. will utilize the most efficient method or techniques of construction, tools, or other labor-saving devices and there shall be no limitations upon their choice of materials or design. BNFL Inc. has the right to staff the work in a flexible manner that effectively and efficiently utilizes the skills and acquired experience of the workforce, consistent with the employee(s) ability to safely perform the work; and, recognizing the special nature of the Project, shall have the right to place employee(s) on composite crews, and to freely transfer such employee(s) among the various tasks assigned to such crews.
Employees joining BNFL Inc. will participate in a weeklong induction course where they are expected to take on an active role as a team member. The course emphasizes the need for employees to be committed to safety, flexible working, and productivity.
CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX
Project Scope
On August 25, 1997, DOE signed a $238,000,000 fixed price contract with BNFL Inc. to decontaminate and decommission three gaseous diffusion plant buildings, associated equipment and materials at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), formerly known as the K-25 Site, at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Decontamination and decommissioning of K-29, K-31, and K-33 would be accomplished by BNFL Inc. dismantling and removing the process equipment and related support systems, recycling the metals to the extent economically practical, and cleaning up the interior of the buildings to the specified end point criteria cited DOE Order 5400.5 supplemented with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86.
Description of Buildings
The K-33 Building contains eight inactive gaseous diffusion process units consisting of ten cells each. Each cell contains eight "stages," with each stage consisting of process equipment, including an electric motor, axial flow compressor, a converter containing a large surface area barrier material, associated process piping and valves, and support equipment on the operating floor of each building. Thus, the K-33 Building has a total of 640 stages requiring removal. The K-31 Building contains six inactive gaseous diffusion process units consisting of ten cells each. Each cell contains ten stages, resulting in a total of 600 stages requiring removal. The K-29 Building contains three inactive gaseous diffusion process units consisting of ten cells each. Each cell contains ten stages, resulting in a total of 300 stages requiring removal. Taken together, the three process buildings house a total of 1,540 stages requiring removal.
The building sizes are K-33, K-31, and K-29 258,540 m2, 154,380 m2, and 56,300 m2, respectively. The three process buildings hold an estimated 114,373 tonnes of contaminated and potentially contaminated metals including iron, nickel, aluminum, and copper. Approximate quantities of each are indicated in Table I.
Table I. Approximate Metal Quantities
Hazards Associated with the Project
The hazards associated with the buildings are:
Engineered and administrative controls are used to minimize risks from these hazards to protect the worker, public, and the environment.
Project Schedule
The project can be sub-divided into five primary stages, as described below.
The Schedule for the Project is shown in Table II.
Table II. Project Schedule
Processes Employed
The Process Equipment Removal phase of the project involves dismantling the large, uranium-enrichment equipment and removal of the associated support systems. Cold cutting of the metal piping systems will be the primary method for dismantlement. Cold cutting eliminates the potential for hazardous vapor generation that is typical of thermal cutting techniques; therefore, local ventilation and fume filtration will not generally be needed. In addition, the cold cutting process minimizes the spread of radioactive contamination and significantly reduces the risk to the workers by eliminating the threat of burns that are common with thermal cutting methods.
The Metal Decontamination/Recycling/Waste Disposal phase of the project will utilize specially developed hot cutting for disassembly of the process equipment and subsequent size reduction of equipment components. A dedicated facility will be constructed to house these systems with remote operations being the fundamental design criteria to ensure the maximum protection to the worker. Radioactively contaminated metal will be processed in an off-site facility using dry techniques for surface cleaning and wet chemistry to decontaminate metal with sub-surface contamination. An electro-refinement process will be used to recover uranium-contaminated nickel components from the uranium enrichment process equipment.
To determine the optimum sequence of work activities, dismantlement and disassembly activities will be evaluated using an Operational Research Model. Equipment transport times, interactions between production steps, craft utilization, and timing of activities will be assessed to reduce downtime, approve space utilization, reduce conflicts between work activities, schedule equipment movement, and evaluate process interfaces between the dismantlement, disassembly, and recycle operations.
The Bnfl Inc. Team
The BNFL Inc. Team consists of employees from BNFL Inc., Manufacturing Science Corporation (MSC), Science Application International Corporations (SAIC), and American Technologies Inc. (ATI).
The Prime Responsibilities of the partners are:
Project Mission and Vision Statements
Mission
To safely and successfully:
Vision
Teamwork is paramount to the success of this project. Recognizing this:
Our vision is to set the standard of excellence in nuclear decommissioning.
We will establish a reputation for doing work safely, cost effectively,
and in a caring manner for our people, the community, and the environment.