A STAKEHOLDER-BASED RISK CHARACTERIZATION OF
THE NEVADA TEST SITE RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT SITES

A. E. Hechanova, B. T. Mattingly, P. S. Morris, and L. J. O'Neill
Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

ABSTRACT

Results of the present study indicate that current risks to the public at the perimeter of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) from radioactive waste disposal at the Area 3 and 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) are negligible because there is no significant pathway by which contamination can migrate to the NTS border. Results for risks 100 years in the future from public land use of the RWMS locations are dependent on land-use scenarios. Low or negligible risks are predicted for land-use scenarios that do not disturb the waste, such as industrial surface, cultural, and recreational land-use scenarios. Medium risks (and one case of high risk for the Greater Confinement Disposal Test borehole) are predicted for the Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual (MEHI) if some waste locations are intruded upon through inadvertent drilling (part of the Ranching and Residential land-use scenario). The MEHI concept is a type of worst-case scenario and used as a bounding case to identify potential significant hazards.

The results presented in this paper are interim in light of the following considerations: (1) complete inventories of NTS RWMS contaminants are not yet publicly available and source term characterization is based upon currently available information from the U. S. Department of Energy, its contractors, and other sources; (2) land-use scenarios are based upon stakeholder interests and are still evolving; and (3) refinements to technical assumptions (e.g., site-specific transport and exposure parameters) and techniques may produce different results. However, because of the iterative nature of risk assessments and the interactive nature of risk communication, it is important to convey interim approaches and results in order to address broad stakeholder concerns.

BACKGROUND

The Nevada Risk Assessment/Management Program (NRAMP) is a joint effort of the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), and the firm of E. J. Bentz and Associates of Springfield, Virginia, funded by a U. S. Department of Energy grant (No. DE-FG01-96EW56093) to conduct independent stakeholder-based risk assessment and risk management evaluation of DOE environmental management activities in Nevada. Andrews et al.(1) presented the basis for preliminary results at WM97. The present paper gives the results from one of the milestones of that study, namely, for the Radioactive Waste Management Sites source category.

The concept for NRAMP results from National Research Council (NRC) recommendations to the DOE that the credibility of site-wide risk assessments would be greatly enhanced if the evaluator were other than the DOE and its contractors(2). The NRC identified six criteria which an institution should satisfy in order to establish credibility:

The Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies is an interdisciplinary research center at UNLV that satisfies the above criteria and administers NRAMP. Potential hazards from DOE radioactive waste management at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is one of several sources of risk under the purview of NRAMP.

Since the inception of NRAMP in March 1995, various mechanisms have been implemented to gather a broad-based understanding of stakeholder concerns including monthly stakeholder working group meetings (held May 1995 through December 1996), radioactive waste management focus group meetings (ongoing since October 1997), a Nevada public opinion survey(3), interactions with the Community Advisory Board for NTS Programs and the DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), UNLV Continuing Education courses, and special lectures and seminars. Short- and long-term risks to the public and environment from radioactive waste management at the NTS was a clearly identifiable issue of concern to public stakeholders.

There are two operational Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) located on the NTS, one in Area 3 and another in Area 5. The Area 3 RWMS, see Fig. 1, is located in south-central Yucca Flat which is an alluvium-filled valley. The waste cells are seven nuclear subsidence craters (subsidence craters are formed by the collapse of the ground into a nuclear test cavity) which were chosen because (1) of the density of the alluvium chimney, (2) their nuclear detonation points were located at greater than 500 feet above the groundwater table, and (3) the groundwater table is approximately 1500 feet below the surface in Area 3. It has been disposing of mostly bulk low-level radioactive waste from the cleanup of NTS sites previously contaminated by atmospheric testing since the disposal site opened in the mid-1960s. Several years later, Area 3 began receiving waste from off-site Defense Waste generators. Wastes are mainly in the form of contaminated soil, concrete, and scrap metal debris from nuclear test operations.

The Area 5 RWMS, see Fig. 2, is located on Frenchman Flat which is a closed alluvium-filled basin in the southeastern corner of the NTS with a minimum depth to the groundwater table of 770 feet. This RWMS has accepted non-bulk packaged low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) from on-site since 1961 and began accepting off-site DOE waste in 1976. The Area 5 RWMS also houses the Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes which contain primarily high activity wastes (such as tritium and 90Sr) and transuranic (TRU) wastes which are not suitable for disposal in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico.

ANALYSIS

While stakeholder interactions were progressing, the NRAMP staff was developing risk assessment methodologies that could answer some of the questions (i.e., those of a technical nature) being posed. Since the components of a scientific risk assessment (such as source term characterization; contaminant transport, exposure, and dose modeling; and risk evaluation) are still under development, refinement, and peer review, the preliminary risk assessment presented in this paper utilized a Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual (MEHI) risk concept. This concept is a type of worst-case analysis in which (1) individuals (defined by Reference Man(4)) conduct typical lifestyle activities at contaminated sites without regard to the contamination and (2) these hypothetical activities occur at a location of maximum exposure to the contamination source under the prescribed scenarios (e.g., 70-year lifetime chronic exposure). The MEHI risk concept is used for the following reasons:

Some precautions in using the MEHI risk concept are:

Fig. 1. Layout of NTS Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site, adapted from Elletson and Johnejack(5).

Fig. 2. Layout of NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, adapted
from Shott et al.(6).

Public land use scenarios formulated by stakeholder discussions consider occasional (e.g., cultural and recreational) use and continual (e.g., industrial, ranching, and residential) use. MEHI exposures were assumed at the NTS site boundary at the present time and on the RWMS locations in 100 years. The latter date is a result of an arbitrary but generally accepted assumption for the date of site release for public access since the assurance of federal institutional control beyond 100 years was not acceptable to stakeholders. Examples of these public land use scenarios are given in Table I. Input parameters to the Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System (MEPAS) transport and exposure code representing these scenarios are given in Table II. The detailed methodology used in this study is contained in Volume II of the NRAMP Preliminary Risk Assessment(7).

The term risk has many technically precise as well as colloquial meanings. The risk terminology used in this assessment is defined in Table III and reflects discussions with a variety of stakeholder groups. The nominal probability risk factor for a fatal cancer(8) is used in calculating risks because this is the detrimental effect expected to generate the highest risk value and the linear no-threshold assumption for radiation protection provides an easy method to evaluate relative risk. Other detrimental effects, such as genetic mutation, will have a lower incremental lifetime risk value. The dividing lines listed in Table III (e.g., between Medium and High risk) have relation to regulatory and protection standards such as those recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection(8).

The above components of a radiological risk assessment have undergone scientific peer review(9) and were part of a standardized methodology used by NRAMP staff for preliminary risk assessments(7). Where possible, radiological exposure parameters were taken directly from available DOE Performance Assessments (6, 10, 11). Most of the RWMS contamination source data available for this analysis are from performance assessments and inventory reports published by DOE. Tables IV and V list the inventories from these reports considering decay to the 100-year future time frame. Supplemental information such as waste volume and configuration was provided by personal conversations with DOE/NV personnel. However, much information concerning the complete RWMS radionuclide inventory is still unavailable because of inadequate record-keeping practices in the past and the fact that wastes disposed of before 1988 were not required to be part of DOE Performance Assessments. The inventories and doses used in this study are based on as much information as could be reliably obtained. For some cases, the actual exposures were not calculated, but were inferred based on the known results of other calculations and a few additional assumptions. For example, the cultural, recreational, and industrial land use scenarios were considered to be equivalent because they do not disturb (infiltrate into) the waste zone.

Another difficulty in determining the source term is that the RWMSs are still actively accepting new waste from cleanup projects in and outside of Nevada, and the source term is constantly changing. Therefore, in this study, in addition to existing contamination, a worst-case disposal site filled to capacity is also analyzed in order to perform risk assessments for the future time frame.

Table I. Examples of Public Land Use Scenarios Considered in the Assessment.

Public Land Use Scenarios

Examples

Cultural

Native American ceremonies

Recreational

Hiking

Industrial

Worker at solar energy generating facility

Ranching

Cattle ranches with some agricultural crops

Residential

Isolated housing units

Table II. Land Use Scenario Values.

Parameter

Units

Cultural and Recreational Scenarios

Industrial Scenario

Ranching and Residential Scenarios

Exposure Frequency

days/year

12

230

365

Exposure Duration

hours/day

24

10

24

Amount of Soil Ingested Incidentally

mg/day

50

50

50

Ingestion Rate of Water

liters/day

2

2

2

Frequency of Fugitive Dust Inhalation

days/year

12

230

365

Duration of Fugitive Dust Inhalation

hours/day

24

10

24

Frequency of Soil Contact

days/year

12

230

330

Duration of Soil Contact

hours/day

24

10

8

Vegetable Production Percentage

percent

NAa

NA

100

Leafy Vegetable Consumption

g/day

NA

NA

48

Other Vegetable Consumption

g/day

NA

NA

295

Meat Consumption

g/day

NA

NA

260

Milk Consumption

g/day

NA

NA

850

Duration in Shower

minutes

NA

NA

7

Body Weight

kg

70

70

70

Exposure Period

years

70

70

70

Lifetime

years

70

70

70

Inhalation Rate

m3/hour

0.83

0.83

0.83

Retention of Inhaled Air

percent

100

100

100

Skin Surface Area

cm2

18,150

18,150

18,150

Skin Area Contacted by Soil

percent

10

10

10

Soil to Skin Adherence Factor

mg/cm2

0.10

0.10

0.10

Fraction of Time Spent Outdoors

dimensionless

1

1

.33

Indoor Shielding Factor

dimensionless

NA

NA

.7

a NA: not applicable to scenario.

Table III. Definition of terms for the Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual
Risk Evaluations Used in this Preliminary Risk Assessment.

Term

Lifetime Riska Range

Comment

Negligible Risk

Less than 1 in 1,000,000

Negligible risk level by federal regulations

Low Risk

Between 1 in 1,000,000 and 1 in 1000

Below ICRPb recommendation to public

Medium Risk

Between 1 in 1000 and 1 in 10

Above ICRP recommendation to public

High Risk

Greater than 1 in 10

Above ICRP tolerable level

a Risk is the incremental lifetime probability of the Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual contracting a fatal cancer from the exposure.
b International Commission on Radiological Protection(8).

For the Area 3 RWMS, intrusion was evaluated for a full and closed shallow land burial site (the U3ax/bl unit) because a DOE published inventory(5) was available. There is no published study (such as a Performance Assessment) which analyzes an undisturbed site, so the cultural, recreational, and industrial scenarios at the Area 3 RWMS are assumed to be similar to the Area 5 RWMS.

For the Area 5 RWMS, two shallow land burial cases are considered from projected inventory values published in a DOE Performance Assessment(6). First, a projected inventory in shallow land burial at Area 5 is considered. This projection only includes waste disposed between 1988 and 2028 and was extrapolated by Shott et al.(6) using records between 1988 and 1992. The second case considers the disposal unit designated Pit 6. Pit 6 is a unique site because it contains a large amount of thorium in a deep cell excavation. Normal low-level radioactive waste will then be disposed of on top of the thorium cell. Shott et al.(6) has shown that the Pit 6 unit constitutes a limiting case for exposure to individuals and is analyzed separately because it is expected to provide a bounding result. For the Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes, each borehole is examined separately.

Table IV. Inventories for Area 5 RWMS Shallow Land Burial and Projected for Pit 6,
and Area 3 RWMS Shallow Land Burial Decayed to the Year 2098.a

Area 5 RWMS (projected inventories)

Area 3 RWMS (existing inventory)

Shallow Land Burial
(projected inventory disposed between 1988 and 2028) b

Pit 6 Lower Cell (from projected thorium inventory) c

Craters U3ax/bl Disposal Unit d

Radionuclide

Curies

Radionuclide

Curies

Radionuclide

Curies

3H

6010

210Pb

0.76

3H

1480

14C

4.09

226Ra

1.28

235U

0.714

63Ni

2.2

228Ra

277

238U

2.81

90Sr

0.915

228Th

277

239Pu

0.0962

137Cs

1.01

230Th

42.87

241Pu

4.81

151Sm

0.082

232Th

277

241Am

0.0404

210Pb

0.094

 

 

 

 

226Ra

0.111

 

 

 

 

227Ac

0.093

 

 

 

 

228Ra

2.19

 

 

 

 

228Th

1.95

 

 

 

 

230Th

0.954

 

 

 

 

231Pa

0.106

 

 

 

 

232Th

1.89

 

 

 

 

232U

0.050

 

 

 

 

234U

535

 

 

 

 

235U

30.2

 

 

 

 

236U

0.859

 

 

 

 

238U

1020

 

 

 

 

238Pu

73

 

 

 

 

239Pu

118

 

 

 

 

240Pu

24.5

 

 

 

 

241Pu

4.37

 

 

 

 

241Am

20.5

 

 

 

 

244Cm

0.043

 

 

 

 

a The year 2098 is used for the future land use time frame in this analysis. Activities below 0.04 Ci are not included in this table to save space, however, activities down to 10-10 Ci were considered in the analysis.
b Original projected inventory is from Shott et al.(6). Note: does not include inventory projected for Pit 6.
c Original inventory is from Shott et al.(6). All daughter products are considered to be in equilibrium with their parents.
d Original inventory is from Elletson and Johnejack(5).

For radioactive releases that are not caused by human intrusion, such as through plant growth and gas migration, this analysis uses the results of the DOE Performance Assessments to determine dose to a Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual. For exposure scenarios that consider human intrusion (namely the ranching and residential land uses), the land use scenarios are analyzed using the MEPAS code as described in Volume II of the Preliminary Risk Assessment(7) using the parameters given in Table II.

Table V. Inventories in curies for Area 5 RWMS Greater Confinement
Disposal Boreholes Decayed to the Year 2098.a

Radio-

Borehole Desgination

nuclide

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

Test

3H

 

 

 

 

3710

 

 

1720

689

90Sr

 

 

 

 

 

18.3

 

 

27,000

137Cs

 

71.7

 

 

 

20

 

 

1260

210Pb

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

91.3

226Ra

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

94.1

227Ac

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.212

234U

0.25

0.175

0.0841

 

 

 

 

 

 

235U

0.0677

0.0474

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

238U

 

 

 

0.431

 

 

1.88

 

 

238Pu

1.63

 

0.995

1.66

 

 

 

 

 

239Pu

126

2.55

83

138

 

 

 

 

 

240Pu

28.2

0.573

18.6

31

 

 

 

 

 

241Pu

1.94

 

0.792

1.32

 

 

 

 

 

241Am

51.2

1.02

23.1

26.9

 

 

 

 

 

a The year 2098 is used for the future land use time frame in this analysis. Original inventory is from Chu and Bernard(12). Activities below 0.04 Ci are not included in this table to save space, however, activities down to 10-10 Ci for all radionuclides were considered in the analysis.

RESULTS

Present risks at the perimeter of the Nevada Test Site from radioactive waste disposal at the RWMSs in Areas 3 and 5 are negligible because there is no significant pathway by which contamination can migrate to the NTS border. Groundwater contamination was not considered a credible pathway because the groundwater table is more than 500 feet below the test cavities at the bottom of the chimneys under the disposal craters in Area 3 and 650 feet below the bottom of the GCD boreholes in Area 5; and, DOE analyses have shown that surface water does not reach the groundwater in these areas.

Results for risks 100 years in the future from Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual public land use of the RWMS locations are summarized in Table VI. The cultural, recreational, and industrial land use scenarios assume occupation of the land without disturbing the waste (such as by drilling) and negligible risk from undisturbed sites was determined for shallow land burial units. The highest shallow land burial risk levels were found for the ranching and residential scenarios. They are a medium-level MEHI risk in the Area 5 RWMS resulting mostly from exposure to 232Th from Pit 6 which accounts for 79 percent of the risk; and, a low-level MEHI risk in the Area 3 RWMS resulting mostly from the inhalation and ingestion of tritium and uranium.

The Greater Confinement Disposal boreholes (located in the Area 5 RWMS) have a negligible or low-level MEHI risk associated with occupying the site if the waste remains undisturbed. For scenarios considering drilling into the GCD boreholes, a high-level MEHI risk results from drilling into the GCD Test borehole. Ninety-five percent of this risk results from ingestion of 90Sr.

DISCUSSION

It is important to note that this preliminary risk assessment is not a baseline risk assessment, but rather an initial screening assessment of relative radiological risk producing limited information (MEHI evaluations). A major disadvantage of the MEHI risk is that results may be construed or misrepresented as a real risk to the public at large when, for some cases, if the probability of occurrence were taken into account, the risk levels may drop to negligible.

Table VI. Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual risk a and dose evaluation
for scenarios in 100 years.

Disposal Site

Recreation or
Industrial

Dose to well driller
(in 100 hours)

Ranching or
Residential

Major radionuclides and exposure pathways contributing to dose

U3ax/bl unit

Negligible Risk b

Negligible Risk
< 10-6
0.0005 mrem

Low Risk
7 x 10-6
0.5 mrem/year

3H, 238U,
and 235U inhalation and ingestion

Area 5 shallow land burial (other than Pit 6)

Negligible Risk
< 10-6
0.01 mrem/year

Low Risk
1 x 10-6
2 mrem

Low Risk
4 x 10-4
10 mrem/year


14C inhalation

Pit 6

Thorium

Negligible Risk
< 10-6
0.01 mrem/year

Low Risk
4 x 10-5
80 mrem

Medium Risk
2 x 10-3
100 mrem/year

232Th and 228Ra inhalation and ingestion

GCD Test

Low Risk
2 x 10-4
6 mrem/year

Medium Risk
2 x 10-2
30,000 mrem

High Risk
> 0.1
> 1,000,000 mrem/year


90Sr ingestion

GCD 1

Negligible Risk c

Low Risk
5 x 10-5
90 mrem

Medium Risk
2 x 10-2
700 mrem/year

239Pu and 241Am ingestion and external exposure

GCD 2

Negligible Risk

Low Risk
2 x 10-4
300 mrem

Medium Risk
9 x 10-2
5000 mrem/year

137Cs external exposure

GCD 3

Negligible Risk

Low Risk
3 x 10-5
70 mrem

Medium Risk
1 x 10-2
400 mrem/year

239Pu and 241Am ingestion and external exposure

GCD 4

Negligible Risk

Low Risk
4 x 10-5
80 mrem

Medium Risk
2 x 10-2
600 mrem/year

239Pu and 241Am ingestion and external exposure

GCD 5

Negligible Risk

Negligible Risk
< 10-6
0.05 mrem

Low Risk
2 x 10-4
20 mrem/year


3H inhalation

GCD 6

Negligible Risk

Low Risk
2 x 10-4
300 mrem

Medium Risk
5 x 10-2
3000 mrem/year

90Sr and 137Cs ingestion and external exposure

GCD 7

Negligible Risk

Low Risk
1 x 10-6
0.5 mrem

Low Risk
4 x 10-4
10 mrem/year


238U ingestion

GCD 10

Negligible Risk

Negligible Risk
< 10-6
0.03 mrem

Low Risk
1 x 10-4
10 mrem/year


3H inhalation

a Subjective risk evaluations are defined in Table III. Risk values are the incremental lifetime probability of a Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual contracting a fatal cancer using a 70-year lifetime and a linear no-threshold assumption.
b Risks assumed to be similar to shallow land burial in Area 5 RWMS.
c Greater Confinement Disposal units other than GCD Test are predicted to have negligible radionuclide transport from undisturbed sites.

This preliminary risk assessment has not taken the likelihood of the exposure into account. Clearly, the probabilities of a transportation accident causing a contaminant spill versus a member of the public drilling into a Radioactive Waste Management Site are very different. This important consideration is not addressed in a MEHI risk analysis but should be considered when drawing conclusions from the results. For example, Black et al.(13) estimate a 10 percent probability for inadvertent human intrusion into the NTS Radioactive Waste Management Sites and recommend management controls to reduce this probability to less than one percent.

This preliminary risk assessment used a single dose-response curve (the linear no-threshold model) and a single end-point (stochastic radiation carcinogenesis for Reference Man(4)) which allowed consistent relative risk comparison with other NRAMP source categories. However, the use of simple assumptions in the estimation of both dose and risk, without regard to uncertainty or reliability, tends to imply precision beyond actuality. Refined NRAMP methodologies will address these issues in future risk assessments and the preliminary results reported in this study should be communicated in its proper context. This study used a deterministic approach because the capability to perform a probabilistic assessment with rigorous uncertainty analyses is beyond the scope of current NRAMP methodologies.

This analysis relies on DOE Performance Assessments to provide source term and dose information. However, DOE Performance Assessments only consider waste inventories that were disposed of after 1988 because of the date in which the relevant DOE orders(14) took effect. This has been an egregious oversight to many Nevada stakeholders because waste has been disposed of in both RWMSs since the 1960s. A recent agreement between the DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has committed DOE/NV to carry out Composite Analyses accounting for all radioactive waste sources of consequence at the RWMS facilities, including those wastes disposed prior to 1988. The Composite Analyses should provide the best evaluation of risk levels for these areas. The Area 3 and Area 5 Composite Analyses are currently in preparation and have not yet been released. The results presented here are an attempt to provide a preliminary evaluation of present and future risks that will help stakeholders understand the nature of hazards at the Nevada Test Site.

Ongoing work by NRAMP staff includes a better characterization of historic and future waste at the NTS RWMSs. Composite Analyses should add to this knowledge base but their date of release is uncertain. The authors recommend that interim results be provided to independent scientists in Nevada to accelerate research and answer pending stakeholder questions.

Table VII. Important Issues not Covered in this Preliminary Risk Assessment.

Issues identified that cannot be

Native American ownership of the land

addressed directly in a scientific

Ruby Valley Treaty

risk assessment

State of Nevada equity issues regarding out-of-state-generated radioactive waste

 

Ethical matters related to nuclear waste

 

Public mistrust of the DOE and its contractors

Issues identified that are outside

Risk management

the scope of this preliminary

Remediation technologies

risk assessment

Cost/benefit analysis of remediation technologies

 

Application of regulations and compliance standards

 

Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository

 

Interim storage of high-level waste

 

Storage of commercial waste

 

Transportation risks

Issues that are not be addressed

Ecological risk assessments

because of insufficient data

Refined radiologic source term characterization

or time constraints, but are part

Refined land use scenarios, such as mining activities for an industrial land use

of near-future studies

Refined land use scenario parameters

 

Refined radiological dose and risk parameters

 

A probabilistic risk assessment that considers scenario frequency

 

Worker risk assessments

 

Impacts of final closure requirements

 

Longer-term (greater than 100 years) risk assessment time frames

 

Risk from chemical constituents

Several important public issues are not covered in the scope of this paper because (1) they do not lend themselves directly to a scientific risk assessment, (2) they are associated with risk issues outside this risk assessment activity, or (3) they could not be addressed at this time because of insufficient data. Some of these issues are identified in Table VII.

CONCLUSIONS

  • Results of the present study indicate that current risks at the perimeter of the Nevada Test Site from radioactive waste disposal at the Area 3 and 5 RWMSs are negligible because there is no significant pathway by which contamination can migrate to the NTS border.
  • Results for risks 100 years in the future from public land use of the RWMS locations are dependent on land-use scenarios. Low or negligible risks are predicted for land-use scenarios that do not disturb the waste, such as, cultural, recreational, and industrial surface land-use scenarios. Medium risks (and one case of high risk for the Greater Confinement Disposal Test borehole) are predicted for the Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual if some waste locations are intruded upon through inadvertent drilling (part of the ranching and residential land-use scenario).
  • The quantification of risk using the Maximally Exposed Hypothetical Individual (MEHI) risk scenario is useful in responding to stakeholder concerns about safety and future land use but can only provide insight on the location, timing, and severity of various radiological hazards at the RWMSs. MEHI risks should not be construed as predictive risks because a credible prediction requires significant refinements to the quality of available data and analytical technique. These refinements are an ongoing part NRAMP activities.
  • The results presented in this paper are interim in light of the following considerations: (1) complete inventories of NTS RWMS contaminants are not yet publicly available and source term characterization is based upon currently available information from the DOE, its contractors, and other sources; (2) land-use scenarios are based upon stakeholder interests and are still evolving; and (3) refinements to technical assumptions (e.g., closure techniques, and site-specific transport and exposure parameters) and techniques may produce different results. However, because of the iterative nature of risk assessments and the interactive nature of risk communication, it is important to convey interim approaches and results in order to address broad stakeholder concerns.

REFERENCES

  1. W.B. Andrews, E.J. Bentz, D.H. Baepler, C.B. Bentz, A.E. Hechanova, P.A. Jonker, T.E. Johnson, M.D. Pandian, and D.D. Weber, "A Stakeholder-Based Risk Assessment of the Nevada Test Site," WM97 Conference Proceedings, Tucson, Arizona, March 2-6 (1997).
  2. Invitation for Proposals for Projects Designed To Support Risk Assessment and Risk Management Practices Associated With DOE's Environmental Management Programs, Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 66, U.S. Department of Energy, April 6 (1994).
  3. J.S. CONARY and D.L. SODEN, "Public Attitudes, Risk Perceptions, and the Future of the Nevada Test Site," Harry Reid Center, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (July 1996).
  4. Report of the Task Group on Reference Man, Publication 23, International Commission on Radiological Protection, Pergamon Press (1975).
  5. L.W. ELLETSON and K.R. JOHNEJACK, "Waste Inventory Report for the U3AX/BL Disposal Unit at the Nevada Test Site," DOE/NV/11432-193, UC-701, Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. (December 1995).
  6. G.J. SHOTT, L.E. BARKER, and M.J. SULLY, "Performance Assessment for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada," Revision 2.1, Bechtel Nevada (February 1997).
  7. Preliminary Risk Assessment - DOE Sites in Nevada, Vol. I-III, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (December 1996).
  8. 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 60, International Commission on Radiological Protection, Pergamon Press (1991).
  9. E.J. BENTZ, "Peer Review of the NRAMP Draft PRA, DOE Sites in Nevada," E.J. Bentz and Associates (November 1996).
  10. T.A. BAER, L.L. PRICE, J.N. EMERY, and N.E. OLAGUE, "Second Performance Assessment Iteration of the Greater Confinement Disposal Facility at the Nevada Test Site," SAND93-0089, Sandia National Laboratory (April 1994).
  11. L.L. PRICE, S.H. CONRAD, D.A., ZIMMERMAN, N.E. OLAGUE, K.C. GAITHER, W.B. COX, J.T. MCCORD, and C.P. HARLAN, "Preliminary Performance Assessment of the Greater Confinement Disposal Facility at the Nevada Test Site," SAND91-0047, Vol. I-III, Sandia National Laboratories (1993).
  12. M.S.Y. CHU and E.A. BERNARD, "Waste Inventory and Preliminary Source Term Model for the Greater Confinement Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site," SAND91-0170, Sandia National Laboratory (December 1991).
  13. P.B. BLACK, B. MOORE, B. CROWE, M. HOOTEN, K. BLACK, S. RAWLINSON, and L. BARKER, "A Common-Sense Probabilistic Approach to Assessing Inadvertent Human Intrusion into Low-Level Radioactive Waste at the Nevada Test Site," U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (1997).
  14. Radioactive Waste Management, Order 5820.2A, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Defense Waste and Transportation Management (September 1988).

BACK