David L. Pentz
Director
IWPS
Redmond,
Washington, USA
Recaredo del Potro
Director
IWPS
Madrid, Spain
José Alejandro Pina
Consultant
Madrid, Spain
ABSTRACT
In the last fifteen years there has been periodic interest expressed by various entities in the concept of international or regional spent fuel and high-level waste repositories. In this paper a regional repository would be a facility which services a subset of a truly international repository. For simplicity, however, the term "international" is used to cover both concepts.
Interest in international repositories exists for several reasons. Some countries believe that this concept should provide a sensible strategic insurance plan against potential difficulties in successfully siting, characterizing, licensing and operateing a national disposal facility. In some countries, while there may be satisfactory progress in technical and public acceptance activities, there my be economic reasons to choose an international repository provided the safety is equal or better to the national soultion. For other countries, there are obvious inadequate national financial resources because of limited nuclear power industrial bases to absorb the costs; for example, form of these limited bases are those countries which have research reactors and no nuclear power generation capacity. And finally, there are those countries where obvious difficult geologic conditions are perceived to exist which appear sufficiently daunting to even initiate a siting program. This paper has been prepared as a result of the analysis of these potential needs, which might be satisfied by an international repository.
This analysis derived from evaluating many alternative possibilities for a new strategic plan for ENRESA, the national company responsible for all radioactive waste management in Spain. The views and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and thus should not be attributed in any way to ENRESA or the government of Spain. It should be noted, however, that an examination of alternative strategies by ENRESA has been in part pre-empted by a recent decision by the Spanish senate to set up a multiparty committee to review the national policy and associated strategy issues for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste.
This paper explores some of the issues which the authors believe a national program should consider when evaluating whether to support international repositories. Three topics are considered:
Clearly, any national decision to participate in an international repository program will require a convergence of support in all three topics.
SAFETY
Radioactive waste must be managed in a manner which is demonstrably safe and positively encourages public confidence. The methods of supporting safety have been the subject of much sophisticated debate and discussion, but they will not be addressed in this paper. It is, however, evident that safety must be preserved in the conditioning of wastes, their transport and their disposal. Since there is, at this time, no established program for the development of one or more international repositories, safety must be viewed from the perspective of defining the conditions in national programs which both a destination country and an origin country would find mutually acceptable. Safety considerations within a national program must include all aspects of the back end of the fuel cycle; namely, storage, transportation, pre-disposal conditioning, repository operations and finally, long term disposal.
The conditioning of wastes can be done either within the origin country or elsewhere. The practice of reprocessing and production of high-level waste (HLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) forms are parallels to conditioning spent fuel for disposal. Since reprocessing is done only in a few countries, the business practices and legal requirements between nations for this practice provide a useful precedent for evaluating safety issues for international repositories.
Before an origin country allows a utility to commit its fuel to reprocessing beyond its borders, it must be satisfied that safety standards of the destination country which will receive the fuel are consistent with international safety standards, and that these standards are adequately administered and enforced. Effectively, therefore, the destination country through some agency or body must satisfy national and international safety standards and practices, and the origin country must also be independently assured of adequate safety in all of the activities associated with its fuel.
For an international repository, we should expect the long-term safety case to be reviewed by the destination country authorities against both national and international standards, and if adequate, the regulatory authority of the country would issue a license. However, the fuel would not be transported to the destination country for disposal unless the origin country was satisfied with the long-term safety of the international repository into which its wastes would be placed. Similarly, all aspects of the intermediate activities between removal of the spent fuel from the reactor and the final interment within a repository must be reviewed, and both nations must be convinced that the safety standards and procedures are adequate. The responsibility, however, for meeting operational standards and following procedures can only lie with the respective entities conducting each activity.
The licensing procedure for an international repository should be established as a national responsibility within the destination country, consistent with national and international safety standards. For example, a two step licensing process could be required where a land use (construction) permit is first obtained as a result of demonstrated safety, followed by the second step of gaining a license to operate a repository. Alternatively, a one step licensing procedure might be selected by the destination country, which would consider all environmental, safety and legal issues in a single action. The choice of these alternative procedures should clearly be in the hands of the destination country. The origin country needs only to be concerned with operational and long-term safety of the facility, and is not expected to be involved in the costs and decision processes for the development of the repository. Simply put, the development risk should lie with the destination country and the developer.
Presently, the international shipment of nuclear materials is extremely safe and reliable. International standards exist for the manufacture and certification of shipping containers, as well as for the handling of these containers when used to transport nuclear material. An origin country evaluating sending its fuel to an international repository for disposal has a duty to ensure that the systems safety standards are in place and are followed by those entities responsible for waste handling and transport. Once both countries are assured, then the safety of international transport should not be an issue. The Basel Convention, signed by most developed nations, establishes the precedent for the international export of hazardous waste, although this Convention has no direct application to radioactive wastes. The Basel Convention also establishes the precedent that a country should only export wastes for disposal to another country if it is convinced and assured that the environmental standards of the disposal country meet the requirements of the exporting country. The fifth working draft of a new Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, prepared under the auspices of the IAEA (1996), contains these principles and provides a broad framework for the safety evaluation of international repositories and associated activities. This Convention, if ratified, should mitigate allegations that developed nations would attempt to "dump" wastes in lesser developed countries who are interested in the economic benefits associated with waste disposal. The double reviews and evaluations by both destination and origin countries of all aspects of human and environmental safety, as described above, provide a basis for such assurances.
However, in order that destination and origin countries can be mutually assured of these safety considerations, all participants in this co-operative effort must allow open access to appropriate information and records related to the safety of the various systems and processes which create the repository framework. If, however, an international repository meets the safety standards of the origin country and all relevant international standards, then safety should not be a consideration in the policy evaluations of the origin country.
Non-proliferation of fissile materials can be both a safety and a policy consideration. The integration of an international repository into policy considerations about non-proliferation is covered in the last section of this paper.
ECONOMICS
The economics of international disposal must be attractive before the waste generators will agree to ship their wastes and spent fuel to a repository. Most national programs currently are acting either on behalf of a consortium of waste generators or the national government. These national programs periodically make updated predictions of costs to establish an operational national repository. Historically, repository development costs and schedules are very uncertain and are typically prone to escalation, largely due to the extreme technical and political challenges associated with siting and the high standard of safety.
However, if there is no alternative to a national program, the waste generators in many countries have little option but to continue funding their national programs, at the expense of the electrical rate payers, to provide the research and development funds. In some countries the limited nuclear power base clearly creates an inadequate financial base on which to build even a minimal national disposal program. This condition is further magnified if one considers research reactors which exist in countries with no nuclear power generation capabilities. For most of these reactors, some small quantities of long-lived radioactive wastes will be returned after reprocessing occurs. It must be recognized that even small quantities of spent fuel or high level wastes will require a signifiicant minimum capital investment to develop a safe and credible national repository. While such minimum cost estimates will be directly influenced by the geological simplicity of a repository, they are more likely to be dominated by the uncertain costs associated with public and political acceptance. It is asserted here that it is very unlikely that any program, including construction, could not be reasonably contemplated for less than US$500 million, regardless of the quantity of high level wastes and spent fuel that would be placed in the repository.
If an international repository program is developed, at some point the probability of success and expected costs of national programs would have to be compared with the certain costs of sending wastes to an international repository. The probability of success would be a function of a series of correlated factors, including public acceptance, political acceptance, ability to demonstrate safety, and overcoming legal hurdles. All of these factors influence the expected costs and development schedule. Such assessments of success would require objectivity and independence, and clearly the utilities or waste generators within a nation would have a keen interest and should participate in such an evaluation, since in a real sense it is their money that is being risked. As part of this overall assessment of the chances of success, there must be a recognition that once a key element of a program strategy fails, regardless of the cause, the cost of the next program strategy will be significantly higher. One reason is because of the likelihood that the public will lose further confidence in the program and will impose even higher standards.
In conducting such assessments, however, there are clearly some considerable difficulties. The first is that the process of conducting these independent reviews may generate within the nation enhanced fear or simply increase the difficulties of gaining public acceptance for the national facility. So in a sense, unless carefully orchestrated and conducted, such reviews might themselves negatively influence the probability of success of the national program. However, it should be stated that national programs which are likely to be successful should be able to withstand such objective reviews. Such reviews are commonplace in public companies where it is the responsibility of the Board of Directors to periodically review the performance of the management team and the business strategies.
Clearly, prior to the development of an international repository, there will be a series of steps which could be viewed unambiguously as threatening to national programs. Those nations which would not wish to be considered as a destination country for either technical, political or social reasons could make their views known. However, it is suggested that many countries would wish to have the option of exporting their wastes to a suitably safe international repository. As discussed above, this could be an insurance policy against failure of their national programs, due either to very high costs or the inability to adequately prove safety and thus gain public acceptance. In a global sense, the world communities have stated their intention to solve the radioactive waste disposal problem in this generation.
POLICY
The policy issues associated with participating in an international repository are the most challenging, and they are unique for each country making such a consideration. Several topics appear to be at the top of the list for consideration.
National Environmental Policy
It has generally been accepted that each country should be self-reliant in the management of its wastes. There does not appear to be any global environmental foundation for this view, and there are very strong arguments in opposition. Most developed countries are reliant on other countries for many strategic items, including primary energy materials, minerals, food, and a variety of specific manufactured goods. The environmental community has properly reinforced the concept that environmental problems caused by emissions, such as gases which damage the ozone, greenhouse gases, and effluents released into international waters should be solved on an international or global basis. The management of some radioactive wastes should also be viewed in the same manner. If there are better global solutions in terms of environmental considerations and economics which meet national and international safety and environmental standards, then these solutions should be embraced by the environmental community and by governments. The philosophy of national self-reliance is a myth and should not constrain the appropriate management of radioactive wastes.
National Nuclear Policy
Some of those individuals opposed to nuclear power are inherently opposed to all repository programs, in part because of concern that successful disposal of HLW and spent fuel will lead to more nuclear development. Further nuclear development, however, will reduce the rate of emission of greenhouse gases, depending on the extent that this alternative replaces other forms of energy. Clearly, the satisfactory solution to disposal will not of itself open the doors to further nuclear power development because the economics of such electricity generation will play a key role in decisions to proceed. No government wants to select a solution to one problem which will create other equal or worse problems. The challenge to developing nuclear power as an option to assist in reducing the rate of global warming is rooted in the lack of confidence by the public in the safety of nuclear power. Therefore, when evaluating participation in an international repository program, a government must be confident that any new nuclear power facilities developed as a result of the availability of an international repository should be constructed and operated to the highest safety standards.
Nuclear Waste Management Policy
At the present time each nation with developed nuclear power generation capability has the responsibility for managing its wastes in a safe manner prior to disposal. This responsibility includes safe storage away from the reactors, an option which becomes more economically desirable as the number of decommissioned reactors increases. One of the most difficult challenges that faces the international repository concept will arise from the fact that national programs which have selected a successful disposal strategy may have the added burden of assuring their public that their national repository was not a "trojan horse" for an international repository. Such suspicions can be expected to partially, if not completely, disappear once one or more countries takes the step to seriously evaluate becoming a destination country with an international repository. Once this step occurs, then the international repositories will increasingly be viewed as insurance for national programs. In any case, for the reasons stated above, it will be necessary to assure concerned citizens that it will be impossible for wastes to be transferred from one nation to another without bilateral agreements between the origin and destination countries. Such agreements could only be attained by mutually satisfying policy, commercial, and safety issues.
As a result, it is unwise from a policy standpoint to exclude the possibility of exporting spent fuel and high level waste to an international repository. Further, if a national policy is adopted to prohibit exporting nuclear wastes, that nation would implicitly be stating to its public that there is 100% certainty that the national program would successfully site, license, and operate a national repository within acceptable cost and time limits. Surely, there are only a few nations, if any, that would be so bold as to be this certain of their success. It can therefore be argued that, as a minimum, the concept of developing international or regional repositories should be endorsed by all nations, both from an insurance viewpoint as well as solving a needed problem for those countries with inadequate economic resources and/or those lacking suitable geology.
International Waste Management Policy
Non-proliferation is a matter of high concern to all responsible countries. The fact is that there are a variety of nations with research reactors which have fissile material and small or no associated nuclear power generating programs. As stated earlier, many such countries will not have adequate economic base to consider the significant additional costs for disposing of their long-lived radioactive waste emanating from these reactors. If is these nations that have probably the strongest reason to endorse the concept of regional or international repositories. The international community should therefore link the availability of international repositories to minimizing the dangers of uncontrolled fissile materials by requiring direct and immediate disposal of such material once it becomes spent fuel.
CONCLUSIONS
Participation in an international or regional repository should be comprehensively considered by any country which presently generates nuclear wastes or spent fuel. A decision to participate in an international repository must be supported by progress in a series of affirmative considerations of safety and economics within a robust national nuclear waste management and disposal policy. It is likely that more initiatives to develop international repositories will emerge as nations look more carefully at the probability of success of their national programs. Each nuclear nation, in concert with its utilities, must establish a waste management strategy by which it might participate in one or more international disposal programs. A key element of the strategy would include independent national review bodies to evaluate not only the technical progress of national programs, but also the overall probability of success these programs will achieve within agreed upon economic limits and timetables.