

LESSONS LEARNED FROM DOE SITE CULTURE CHANGE ACTIVITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR WASTE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Management Systems Laboratories (MSL) has worked with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and several of its contractors as they understand and assess the DOE culture change and change the contractor culture to serve DOE's needs. Primarily, these contractors have been those whose responsibilities include starting up and operating weapons materials facilities. The number and scope of these activities have escalated and expanded to contractors at DOE sites such as Westinghouse at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina, EG&G at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) in Golden, Colorado, and Westinghouse at the Feed Materials Processing Center (FMPC) in Fernald, Ohio.

The point of this paper is not to compare or contrast the relative merit of one site over another. It is to show the lessons, good and bad, and use and communicate those lessons, especially those lessons transferable to other sites in similar situations. I've looked at what's transferable from all of our experiences. I want to take both the good and the bad lessons learned from any of the sites and make these lessons available for use in future work. No one site was perfect and no one site was terrible. So, for this reason, it's neither appropriate to identify sites by name nor to use generic labels like Site A and Site B, which would show how many situations originated in a particular site. I have taken care to protect the identities of the individual sites involved.

Instruments designed to assess culture have helped to begin identifying behaviors counter to the desired culture. Meetings, workshops, motivational speeches, and other means help communicate and illustrate culture change activities. Hoopla (e.g., dinners, awards ceremonies) and symbolism play important roles in getting employees aware and motivated to become involved in the culture change while generating enthusiasm and displaying symbols of the new culture.

Experience and lessons learned in these DOE and DOE contractor organizations should apply in other similar organizations, including those focusing on waste management at DOE sites. Waste management organizations face many issues, such as public scrutiny, heightened expectations, changing mission, resource shifts, and strategies to accomplish their mission (1). Combined with the Secretary of Energy's call for a new culture, based on DOE's being "a victim of long-term cultural misdirection" (2), the rapid fundamental change in environment beckons the need for culture management in all DOE organizations.

MSL has responded to managers and senior managers throughout many DOE organizations, including headquarters in Washington and field sites throughout the country. From these experiences, I can relate many lessons learned about culture change in these organizations.

Experience in DOE sites has demonstrated some success of several culture change activities. Organizations dealing with hazardous materials such as waste management organizations can add to their efforts in culture change by considering the lessons learned. Based on these experiences, waste management organizations and their associated contractors can put the lessons learned to work for their organizations to design and implement their culture change programs.

INVOLVEMENT WITH DOE CULTURE CHANGE

MSL's involvement with the DOE and culture change over the past year and a half has covered many of the preliminary steps an organization should take when contemplating culture change. A series of papers captures some of what MSL has learned to date about organizational culture change in practice (3,4,5). I began by briefing top managers on culture--what it is and what its elements are. I

progressed to more detailed briefings emphasizing empirical issues such as observation, identification, and measurement of key cultural elements. I assisted in the managers' need for hoopla and symbolism (e.g., buttons, plaques, posters, and audiovisual materials) in generating enthusiasm for the new culture. At one site, I designed a survey to measure attitudes regarding the new culture.

MSL's recent intensified involvement with DOE and culture change began in late 1989 with the start of a series of organizational culture presentations. The first wave of these presentations covered the basics: defining organizational culture, examining why managers need to understand culture, and explaining various concepts associated with organizational culture. The second wave of these presentations, starting in March, 1990, went into more depth. In the second wave, I presented definitions and concepts important to an understanding of organizational culture, and began developing an approach to culture change and the need for managers to not only understand culture, but to be able to change culture as well. I gave them examples of other organizations' culture change and then I shared with them what their culture was changing to and what was causing that culture to change. I worked with the sites to decide: 1) whether or not the culture will change, 2) what the new culture was going to be, and 3) what sorts of things needed to happen to make that culture change. Those ideas were consistently communicated to very large groups of people, 160 top managers, who in turn communicated these ideas to their suborganizations. I developed a "culture change map," a detailed flow chart outlining an initial view of the elements involved in identifying what to change in the culture, how to change those elements, and how to measure culture change. This culture change map was prepared in response to one DOE manager's comment concerning the lack of operationalization of organizational culture change. I consider the map to be rudimentary, a first cut at a seemingly boundless domain but one that needs structure so managers can take action to manage culture to their benefit.

My presentations were concentrated at three DOE field sites. At one site, I made presentations starting with top executives, working my way into several groups of 100-150 managers at a time. This broad coverage communicated the same message to large groups of people within a short three-month time frame. These senior managers then carried the message to their people to further communicate the presentation content to the thousands of professionals and hourly workers at the site. At another site, I made presentations to executives and a few select managers. At the other site, I made presentations to their advisory group.

In addition to presentations, I designed a survey instrument to capture general and specific opinions and attitudes regarding the change in O&M contractors. I administered the survey, and collected and analyzed the results. This application supplied valuable data for site managers to evaluate the impact new management had on the site based on a variety of measures. I found people were in tune with culture change. I found people felt the direction of the change in culture was appropriate. But, I also found they didn't believe management backed it.

I've dealt with some of the symbolism. Hoopla played an important part in communicating the culture. I designed buttons espousing the new values and the new organization and distributed them to site managers. I've also put together statements of shared values for managers to display on their desks. In addition, one of the site executives went further in promulgating the new culture. He had posters put up espousing elements of the new culture. He had other symbolic articles made with the plant's slogan about its new culture affixed.

Organizational culture consists of values and traditions--the things we hold dear. These aren't changed as easily as other aspects of our organizations (e.g., introducing new manufacturing processes, new technologies). Changing organizational culture is an emotional issue, and we must act on it emotionally. Just as membership in a family, church, or university instills particular values and traditions in us, so does our membership in an organization. Members who have held the culture close to their hearts for many years will resist efforts to change. Culture change efforts, to be successful, must take the human concerns of their members into account.

At DOE sites, the culture change has not been completed. I can't say what will work and what won't work with any degree of finality. I can identify things that seem to be working and that are making progress and people are happy about and I can identify things that seem not to be working and that have been discarded for that reason.

One site, in particular the production staff, was averse to the use of procedures, preferring to depend on the historical means of performing their jobs. They know now they have to use procedures. They don't like everybody saying, "You gotta do this safely no matter what happens." I'm seeing acceptance of the use of procedures and increased awareness of the need for safety in operations; however, they are not convinced that senior management really believes in the new procedures and safety in operations over production. At this site, the lack of confidence in management commitment to procedures and safety lead to a great reluctance of the staff to report or identify non-conformities. The behavior is changing; the attitude is not. What I'm finding at this site is behaviors such as adherence, writing of procedures, and practicing safety are changing. The attitudes, as assessed through attitude surveys, are not keeping up with the behaviors. The attitudes may not have changed at all. Changes in behavior are believed to lead, over time, to changes in attitudes (6). Individuals engaging in behaviors that are incongruent with their attitudes are to be expected--they're experiencing a condition termed by psychologists as cognitive dissonance.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND INFLUENCES

I've seen many general characteristics and influences of culture change that hold implications for all organizations, in particular those organizations involved in potentially hazardous activities such as waste management. These general characteristics and influences help us understand more about organizational culture change in many different types of organizations and set the stage for the discussion of the specific lessons I learned while working with several DOE sites and DOE headquarters.

In many cases, it wasn't the organization that changed. Rather, the world changed and the organization stayed the same. So the need for a change in culture occurred because of the need for the organization to interact better with its environment. In the example of DOE, the increased levels of scrutiny and requests for information led to the development of the Five-Year Plan for environmental remediation and waste management. Similarly, changes in the world are affecting other organizations as well. Organizations today face a more well-informed and information-demanding consumer. The implications of this shift in consumer behavior have caused food packaging to contain information on cholesterol, sodium, and fat content, chemical firms to judiciously monitor the quality of effluents, and politicians to be more accountable to their constituents.

Consequently, in many organizations today, there is an awareness but not the recognition that the culture must change. Managers and executives must listen carefully to what their people are saying. Listening to members of their organizations will give cues to what will work and what won't and how managers and executives can begin culture change efforts in their organizations. People and their organizations know there is a move afoot to a certain culture, but they haven't begun taking the necessary steps toward that culture.

In the larger world, changes in personnel are becoming more commonplace in the current wave of merger and acquisition activity. Also, with the popularity of contract management for large facilities, as is done for the DOE at its field sites, the periodic changeover in contractors brings with it new personnel, usually at the upper levels of management.

The rank and file view contractor changeovers and the subsequent "new" ideas about change with skepticism and are reluctant to change. These workers have been at the site all along and they consider everything to be fine. Their implied comment is, "Why change now? This must be some management notion we can ignore. All things pass and so will this." Culture change efforts should counter this notion, showing how the culture will change regardless of who the

contractor is. This is discussed in more detail under "Lessons Learned."

These contractor changeovers and other causes of personnel changes produce a mix of different people representing different cultures. The tendency in these cases is to tear down the old culture and build a new culture. What should ideally be done, as I'll discuss under "Lessons Learned," is to forge a new culture from the different cultures people bring to the organization. This reduces the feelings of wholesale dissolution of previous cultures and molds the organization in a specific, desired direction.

Many people in organizations are experiencing the pressure from outside forces. These outside forces are driving them toward a defensive stance. The successful will control their own destiny. These organizations are faced with choice of molding to fit or force-fitting. These organizations got involved with culture change simultaneously with the increased pressure from outside. They dealt with the forcing functions to change culture in the midst of other pressing issues. Their culture change efforts improved their ability to stabilize the pressured situation. Pressure was largely a matter of perception, but without a systematic and comprehensive approach many organizations lost the ability to mold their own cultures.

LESSONS LEARNED

I observed and noted example successes and failures when undertaking culture change. Some culture change activities worked successfully at one site, yet were ineffective at other sites. Most of my lessons relate to actual experiences at DOE sites. Knowing what works and why it works gives other organizations attempting culture change a body of experience to draw on.

Get Yourself a Champion

Perhaps the most dramatic lesson I learned in my culture change efforts with DOE sites was the need for a champion. Champions lead the culture change and see the process through to the end. Champions are known throughout the organization, have authority, and are respected. Success in the organization marks the champion, and he or she displays belief in the new culture through emotional leadership--cheerleading. Above all, champions enjoy what they do. My experience points clearly to this lesson: organizations can't change culture without a champion.

The champion must be positioned at a high level in the organization, have authority, and be respected by the employees. In one case, the champion was a senior line executive. I emphasize line and not staff. It wasn't an advisory group, it wasn't a staff position, it was a key line manager. In another case, I had an interested senior manager without

support from his counterparts and his senior management. Guess which one was successful?

The organization at one site supported the concept of culture and met my definition of champion. Another site had a lone wolf who wasn't able to muster support for culture change activities. None of the other managers participated. The manager at this second site had very limited participation from a very limited number of people. What this site had was an honest attempt by one man to do what the total organization should do. He just couldn't build the organization.

The champion's characteristic of being a "cheerleader" is important but not totally essential to his or her success. Champions who are strong managers anchor their success on their strength of belief in the culture change and in the new culture. The deeper the abiding belief and the more relentless the work ethic, the more successful the champion. Managers under these champions "take," that is they pick up on the enthusiasm and the need for change and broaden the involvement and scope of the effort throughout the organization. The difference between a champion who "takes" and one who doesn't is like the difference between an orchestra and a one-man band. These managers should build a supportive management style--founded on openness and trust. These managers, and hopefully champions, should be insiders with a stake in the change being initiated.

Culture change is working where I can identify a champion; it's not working where there's more of a token champion. By token champion, I mean someone lacking management support or authority to speak for and act on behalf of the organization. The site with the token champion tried to take the cream off the top in their culture change efforts. They tried to do the easy things and they never did the long-term things. Because of a lack of management dedication to the culture change, what they wanted to do was make a show of culture change. They did the short-term things that gave instant gratification and instant visibility and they didn't do the long-term things. The lesson here is undertake both short- and long-term efforts. Lay the foundation for real culture change, get instant gratification so people feel good about the culture changing while they're waiting for the more long-term things to take hold.

Beware of Tokenism

At one site, the only evidence of culture change was one sign put up along the highway leading to the plant. The implied message was, "Let's do something." But this was tokenism, merely checking the squares. At another site, every office, all the signs, buttons, and tags said something about culture change. The implied message was, "These guys are serious, they're not going to abandon the culture change effort." In the beginning some people thought these

efforts humorous. In the end these people took the change seriously. Guess which one was successful?

At one site, all the senior managers were genuinely involved in the culture change and were interested in the concepts necessary for culture change. At another site, there was obvious tokenism. All but one of the senior managers sent their administrative assistants or chiefs of staff to culture briefings and meetings. They didn't even send their second line manager.

Manage Symbolism

As I hinted in the tokenism lesson, symbolism is very important for communicating and getting buy-in to culture change. Having the culture message promulgated everywhere sends clear signals that management is behind this change, and it has value for message content in espousing the organization's values in clear, simple terms.

One site had vision and mission statements that were posted on just about every wall. They had buttons, notepads, newsletters, suggestion boxes, and various types of symbolism. At another site, they had one sign on the roadway.

I went to one of the sites and asked to see their mission statement. They pulled out a four-page document that apparently did not reach many of the staff and where it did, it was received as just another management "procedure." In contrast, a different site's mission statement was brief and therefore could be framed with large print and put everywhere. They promoted it so much, people questioned how much they promoted it. No one at the first site ever questioned how much their mission statement was promoted, because they never knew it was promoted, and they were right.

One site integrated quality into its culture and even held a banquet to hand out rewards to employees who have conformed to the quality expectations of the new culture. Another site had nothing of the sort. Guess which one was successful?

Align actions to the New Culture

I learned that all the rituals, the values, and the heroes--everything--should be aimed in the same direction. One site's actions, for the most part, were aimed in the same direction. At another site, management held one set of values yet had rituals espousing a different set of values. Guess which one was successful? Not only do the people become confused, the whole process of culture change becomes confused and ineffective as well when it lacks alignment. So, all management actions must be aligned with the new culture. A manager can take twenty-five actions aiming at the new culture and one action aiming at the old culture, and the single misaligned action will do more dam-

age than the twenty-five actions do good because of people's inertia in changing anything, especially values and traditions.

At one site, the people sincerely wanted to change, but management did not support or empower them. They didn't have the power to change from the bottom-up like Procter & Gamble. At P&G, the people at the bottom wanted to change the culture, and they were formally empowered. In this case, the people wanted to change, management said go ahead but didn't empower them and, in some instances, chastised them when they identified legitimate concerns. Management deeds didn't align with the words. Management mouthed the new culture, but their deeds were against the new culture. The words caused behavior change, but the words alone could not cause attitude change.

I came to three major findings at this site: 1) behaviors are changing--I observed and measured the change, 2) attitudes are not changing to keep pace and I observed and measured this lack of change, and 3) desired behaviors are not being reinforced on a regular basis, and this portends danger in undoing the behavior change. Behavior change is fragile--that is, it may not last long. I learned behavior can change quickly, but attitude change takes time.

This site changed behaviors by writing procedures, training people on the importance of using the procedures (this was one of this site's successes), holding safety meetings and talking up safety. Employees were disciplined for noncompliance with safety procedures.

Forge the New Culture

One site was busy trying to undo the old culture and busy pointing fingers. Another site busily forged a new culture. The first site did not have a supportive culture. A comment frequently heard was "I've done it this way for 10 years and I'm going to continue to do it this way." The second site had a well-defined culture that was harder to change. The first site could have had an easy time of culture change if they wanted to--they had a more informal culture, while the other site had a more formal culture.

Both had a large number of subgroups (around five) that brought different cultures to the organization. These five or so groups played new, additional, and different roles. Each group brought its own culture on top of the existing culture. The first site talked about the old culture, pointing out its weaknesses and pointing fingers to blame. The other site came up with a brand new culture different from the five and different from the old causing the five to pull together toward the new culture. The second site didn't consume its time with blaming the old culture. Guess which one was successful?

DOE overall is trying to shift from a culture emphasizing production at any cost to one more centered around safety. Most DOE facilities "were constructed when still-evolving applicable nuclear safety and environmental standards were significantly different from what they are today and when DOE (and Congress) emphasized production over environmental or safety observance" (7).

My experience strongly suggests the forging of a brand new culture containing pieces from all the diverse groups. This forging produces a mixed and not a compromised culture. The resulting culture is new and does not completely replicate the old culture or any of the diverse groups, though several elements of the old culture may be modified slightly to reflect the new culture. Success requires forging a unified culture from several cultures. This, I believe, is the most valuable lesson I've learned to date in culture change involving new groups of people from several cultures.

Satisfy Stakeholders Along the Way

DOE and its field sites are currently experiencing an increased wave of scrutiny. Their well-known professional ability and integrity must buttress this new scrutiny. The abilities and integrity of technical staff at DOE field sites are not being questioned; the stakeholders are exercising their rights--in all technical fields. Nuclear technical people have historically been a closed society, but continued confidence and credibility absolutely depend on integrity and openness.

In a new culture, candor and openness come first. The new culture demands faith from its stakeholders. One site experienced success when the stakeholders believed and said managers and technical people at that site knew what they were doing. However, and this is a key point: this site didn't communicate the culture change to nor did they get any participation by the stakeholders. Had they gotten the participation from and informed all the stakeholders, they feasibly would have reduced the number and scope of problems they faced.

A second site with fewer stakeholders had an easier job. This site wasn't perceived as being the problem at the same magnitude as first site was. Managers and technical people at this site were probably competent and acted in accordance with government and industry standards and expectations. From now on, though, competency and compliance will have to be proven, for all sites are under the magnifying glass.

Document Everything

One site documented everything they did. This strengthened their position with DOE and stakeholders in general. Their management was able to show the direct

implications of taking specific actions. Their management style was tight, organized, and accountable.

Another site was never able to come to grips with the issues underlying problems which reduced their effectiveness in communicating with the stakeholders. This inability to effectively and accurately communicate with the stakeholders adversely affected perceptions of management competency and reliability.

Managers at these sites should exercise discipline and thoroughness in management of operations. They must demand explanation and rationale to justify strategy, decisions, and actions. They should expect clear documentation that standards were met. And they should judge their site's performance against commercial values, practices, and standards. Meticulous documentation should improve the ability to deal coolly with the facts by making those facts more readily available.

Define the New Culture

I can estimate the direction of DOE's new culture. DOE will centralize from the field into headquarters and create a very prescriptive workplace. DOE will increasingly try to hold contractors financially responsible for their work and work-related infractions. The new culture will demand risk-free operation and must be ready to concede to environmental issues raised by stakeholders. New loyalists will replace resigning or retiring employees.

The old DOE culture is a dichotomy of technical people and managers. In the old culture, roles were ill-defined and qualifications were undocumented and unmonitored. Managers managed and left technical details to technical people. Ability was judged by degrees and experience rather than by performance. The new DOE culture will stress technical inquisitiveness, that's not a function of production. In the new culture, people will learn how to ask the right questions and won't take the first answer for granted.

In the days of the Atomic Energy Commission, the world believed and had faith in technical giants. The new scrutiny strikes at this belief, which is the heart of current happenings in waste management and in everything else. The professional ability and integrity of DOE is being questioned from both inside and outside.

Increase the Half-Life of Change

Without the long-term to support the short-term, there's a very short half-life for culture change or any other type of organizational change. Feelings and excitement about the short-term changes erode without the longer-term foundation. The lesson I learned is: taking long-term actions simultaneously with short-term actions gives those short-term actions a longer half-life.

At one site, management gave culture change lip service. Management's deeds didn't match what they said. Meetings related to the new culture were sparsely attended. Another site used many forms of symbolism: mission statements, management input campaigns, meetings, motivational speakers, and much more. Guess which one was successful?

Importance of Culture is a Relative Issue

There is an awareness of the importance of culture change, but a shortage of accompanying actions. In other words, when the subject of culture is raised, people's ears perk up, but some of them say, "Yes and we've got to change it" or some of them say "Yes, I've heard about that and I am not going to change it." They are all aware that something is happening to their culture.

The importance of culture and culture change is perceived relative to other changes facing the organization. Organizations should think through organizational culture issues before these issues become hot topics of public interest and debate. Organizations must become proactive with regard to culture. One site has been through the roughest part of its culture change and is now able to put culture change in perspective with its balance of organizational issues. There was a time when they were "in the hot seat and everybody was staring right down their throat," to quote an unidentified source. Before that turn came at this site, before they were seen as moving off the hot seat, they were involved with culture change. Guess which one was successful?

Successful organizations focused on culture change before the pressure relaxed. And, given my limited sample, that could imply that it was the culture change efforts that affected the pressure turn-around, rather than vice versa. In other words, it was not a situation where, "Gee, the pressure is off, now we have time to change the culture." It was, "The pressure is on, but we are going to pay attention to culture," and that paying attention to culture helped relieve the pressure. Pressure, like culture, is largely a matter of perception.

Make Lemonade Out of Lemons

It used to be "Just say no" was the catch phrase. That's okay for drugs, but bad for culture. We need to follow the Nike call to "Just do it." As I'll talk about later, the culture change is inevitable: either we can take steps now to change it, or get all embroiled (and perhaps roasted) by those who are critical of our late response. Successful organizations take a positive attitude and look for ways to make lemonade out of lemons--that is, take a bad situation, find the positive angle, and turn the bad situation into a good one.

One site took a lead on culture change. Their management was assertive with the goal of dominating their environment and not being controlled by outside forces. Another site fell prey to a defeatist attitude, believing culture is uncontrollable and that "it's going to get us." Guess which one was successful?

Culture will Change When Threatened

Culture change can be a threatening prospect, but very often organizations won't feel the need to address culture change until they're faced with a life-threatening condition. It is in life-threatening conditions that the relative importance of organizational culture change suddenly increases dramatically. The threat of the organization's demise (or individual's demise) makes many ideas palatable that weren't so before the threat. These organizations are having to deal with the forcing function from their environment to change the culture in the midst of other very significant issues in their lives.

At one site, the leader told management and workers that the culture is going to change regardless of who remains in the organization or who holds the O&M contract for the site. He urged them to face up to the inevitable change. If I could have had the management say what they felt about culture change, it might resemble this: *"Hey, this is bigger than all of us. This is going to happen. If we go away, this is still going to happen. If we help it, it's going to happen faster. If we try to beat it down, it's still going to happen. It may not happen quite as fast, but it's going to happen."* Another site held the notion that they would "bring in the culture," that they knew the answers, "we've done this before." Guess which one was successful?

Differentiate Between Urgent and Important

The manager's unrelenting focus from one urgent activity to another means the important activities have not been addressed early enough. I must differentiate between urgent--activities which have reached crisis level and now demand our immediate attention--and important--activities having to do with results and contributing to the organization's mission, values, or high priority goals (8). Important activities, once neglected, progress into urgent activities, thereby disrupting the manager's coverage of important activities. The technical/production/operational/environmental issues were considered at least more urgent, if not more important than the social/cultural/human issues.

Bypass the Conventional Wisdom

These sites undergoing culture change could not abide by the conventional wisdom that culture change takes forever and costs a fortune. They don't have forever or a fortune. They had to be creative enough to change their

cultures with a reasonable budget and within a foreseeable timeframe. We have to be assertive and manage culture change, and not just let it happen or overwhelm us.

Emphasize the Practical

Many experts on organizational culture emphasize the anthropological issues such as the rites and rituals of corporate life, cultural artifacts, symbols, and precedents. But managers have a bias for action, and put emphasis on the practical. Correspondingly, I learned to emphasize the practical by including anthropological issues only as they relate to changing the workplace culture.

I could have addressed what's wrong with the old culture and what's wonderful about the new culture, but I essentially had to work through three steps: 1) I had to identify what elements of the old culture must change, 2) I had to address how to change those elements, and 3) I had to begin devising ways to measure to see if and how those things changed. By going through this three-step process, I learned I could better meet the practical expectations managers had regarding culture change.

Emphasize the Positive

There's always a positive way and always a negative way to say something or to approach a situation. I observed the effects of framing statements about the old or new culture or process of change in both positive and negative terms. One of the sites took a primarily positive approach to culture change, while another site took a mostly negative attitude toward culture change. Statements framed in negative terms typically worked against managers, while those framed positively worked for the managers.

Embed the Old Culture in the New

Another piece of conventional wisdom claims that it is harder to change a strong culture than a weak culture. In a strong culture, the people understand ritual, they understand symbolism, they understand the elements of the culture, so the culture may change, but the rituals and symbolism are still present. In the site generally considered to have a strong culture, complete with a variety of well-respected rituals, the change in culture didn't require the building of rituals from ground zero. Instead of taking the rituals and demolishing them, management at this site took the rituals and adjusted them slightly. These were the same rituals, different culture. But these rituals had slightly different values. This site was successful when they found a way to embed the values of the old culture inside the values of the new culture.

CONCLUSION

I've concentrated the lessons learned by discussing my experience with two DOE sites, yet these lessons represent

the accumulation of years of working with DOE headquarters and many of its field sites over the past ten years. The following is clear: the DOE culture is changing and will continue to change until it is aligned both with its stakeholders and with the vision set forth by the Secretary. Resistance to this change will only be met by the inevitable: change or be changed.

Managers who are too busy to manage culture and culture change should simply not get involved in the first place. Once we start the culture change process, we can't stop just because it becomes unpleasant. Many of these managers practiced benign neglect and stonewalling wherever necessary. Their common line was, "As soon as we do X, we'll start our culture change activities." Well, X never happened either.

The lessons I've learned bear implications for waste management organizations both within and outside DOE, and can even be generalized to many other types of organizations. My list of lessons is only the beginning, but I believe it to be a valuable start to culture change. By learning from these lessons, we'll be better prepared to tackle the myths and perceptions that work in our organizations against the processes of culture change and enable the building of cultures and organizations aligned simultaneously with the values of those both inside and outside the organization.

In summary, here are the lessons:

- Get yourself a champion.
- Beware of tokenism.
- Manage symbolism.
- Align actions to the new culture.
- Forge the new culture.
- Satisfy stakeholders along the way.
- Document everything.
- Define the new culture.
- Increase the half-life of change.
- Importance of culture is a relative issue.
- Make lemonade out of lemons.
- Culture will change when threatened.
- Differentiate between urgent and important.
- Bypass the conventional wisdom.
- Emphasize the practical.
- Emphasize the positive.
- Embed the old culture in the new.

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